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CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY
REVIEW OF CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP
Scott Burris,* Michael Kempa,** and Clifford Shearing***

I. INTRODUCTION
More and more scholars and activists are talking about governance,
but the literature is “numerous, diverse and fragmented, and has not
formed any consistent tradition.”1 The move to governance seems
broadly to reflect the view that paradigms like “regulation” or the
“Westphalian” system in international relations are no longer capacious
enough to generate useful theory or guide the humane practice of social
control.2 There is widespread agreement that governance is important3
* Professor, Temple University Beasley School of Law; Associate Director, Center for Law and the
Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities; J.D., Yale Law School, 1987. This
paper was prepared for the Salzburg Seminar on the Global Governance of Health, December 2005,
sponsored by the Open Society Institute, and organized by Michael Borowitz, Scott Burris, Derek
Yach, Leo Beletsky and Jennifer Ruger.
**Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of
Ottawa; Ph.D., Australian National University, 2004.
***Professor of Criminology and Director of the Centre of Criminology, Law Faculty, University of
Cape Town, and National Research Foundation South African Research Chair in Security and
Justice.
1. Inger-Johanne Sand, Polycontextuality as an Alternative to Constitutionalism, in
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 41, 44 (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne
Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., 2004). While our review is limited to material published in English,
the concern with governance is, as this volume itself illustrates, global. Given the size and diversity
of the literature, our account is necessarily selective; we have aimed more to represent the
geographic and disciplinary diversity of governance work than to exhaustively catalog any
particular thread.
2. Compare, Michael Moran, Review Article: Understanding the Regulatory State, 32 BRIT.
J. POL. SCI. 391 (2002) (categorizing major scholarly trends within a “regulation” paradigm), with
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (tracking the emergence of a “Renew Deal”
governance paradigm); see also David Fidler, Constitutional Outlines of Public Health’s “New
World Order”, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 247 (2004) (discussing emergence of a new paradigm of
international governance).
3. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
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and that it is (or ought to be) changing.4 But exactly what is
governance? How is it changing, what is happening to the state, and
how are actors at various levels of social organization promoting or
adapting to changes in governance? The aim of this paper is to explore
for a broader legal audience what researchers and theorists in a wide
range of fields have made of the ferment in governance, and to identify
important lessons for people interested in how to improve it locally,
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1993); COMMISSION ON
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD (1995); Richard Dodgson & Kelley Lee,
Global Health Governance: A Conceptual Review in Global Governance: Critical Perspectives 9293 (Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes eds., Routledge 2002); U.N. Human Settlements
Programme [UN-HABITAT], The Global Campaign on Urban Governance: Concept Paper (2d ed.
March 2002), available at http://hq.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/2099_24326_concept_paper.doc
[hereinafter UN-HABITAT]; R.A.W. RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE: POLICY
NETWORKS, GOVERNANCE, REFLEXIVITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (Open University Press 1997);
[hereinafter RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE]; John Braithwaite, Accountability and
Governance under the New Regulatory State, 58 AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 90 (1999); Jody Freeman,
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The
Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2001); Jan Kooiman,
Governance: A Sociopolitical Perspective, in PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE. POLITICAL AND
SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS 71-72 (Jürgen R. Grote & Bernard Gbikpi eds., 2002); Goran Hyden,
Julius Court & Kenneth Mease, Making Sense of Governance: The Need for Involving Local
Stakeholders
(Overseas
Development
Institute
2003),
available
at
www.odi.org.wk/wga_governance/Docs/Making_sense_Governance_stakeholders.pdf; Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Governance Structures, Legal Systems, and the Concept of Law, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
355 (2004); Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory
State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR THE AGE
OF GOVERNANCE 145-46 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004); Jennifer Wood, Cultural
Change in the Governance of Security, 14 POLICING & SOC’Y 31 (2004); Louise G. Trubek, New
Governance Practices in US Health Care, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US
245-46 (G. DeBurca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom & Paul C. Stern, The
Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 SCI. 1907 (2003); Tony Bovaird, Public Governance:
Balancing Stakeholder Power In A Network Society, 71 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 217 (2005); Monica
Blagescu & John Young, Partnerships and Accountability: Current Thinking and Approaches
Among Agencies Supporting Civil Society Organizations (Overseas Development Institute 2005),
available at http://www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/Publications/Documents/WP255.pdf.
4. TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (Christian Joerges, IngerJohanne Sand, Gunther Teubner eds., 2004); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER
(2004); Kooiman, supra note 3, at 71; Peter N. Grabosky, Using Non-Governmental Resources to
Foster Regulatory Compliance, 8 GOVERNANCE 527 (1995); Gunther Teubner, Societal
Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3 (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand, and Gunther
Teubner eds., 2004); David Post & David R. Johnson, Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent:
Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1055 (1998); Lobel, supra note 2; Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Peter J. Spiro, NGO’s in
International Environmental Lawmaking: Theoretical Models, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 770 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey eds.,
2007); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 542 (2007).
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nationally, and internationally. We seek to link what lawyers are writing
to a rich literature on governance theory and practice in other fields.
Specifically, we address two main problems. The Description Problem
poses the question of what is the most accurate, as opposed to the
formal, description of where governance is located and how it is
exercised? The Prescription Problem is how to reform or replace
institutional forms and constraining norms that no longer perform the
functions they once did. In the words of Roberto Unger, legal scholars
tend towards a kind of “institutional fetishism” in matters of governance,
behaving as if the only institutions that can deliver the goods of good
governance are those that have done so in the past.5 The Prescription
Problem in this light is a challenge to practice true innovation in
governance.
We begin, in Part II, by canvassing definitions of governance. Here
there is considerable overlap, if not agreement, across fields as diverse
as health, the environment, and international relations. Governance may
be defined as organized efforts to manage the course of events in a social
system. Governance is about how people exercise power to achieve the
ends they desire, so disputes about ends are tied inextricably to
assessments of governance means. “Governance” is not synonymous
with “good governance.” Any given contemporary governance system
may be inefficient, corrupt, or unresponsive to the needs of the
governed. Governance can be “good” in at least two senses: it can
deliver good results and it can work through processes and institutions
that meet broadly accepted standards of justice and due process. Ideally
governance is good in both of these ways, and, indeed, many people
believe that governance that fails the second criterion normally will have
difficulty delivering on the first.
In Part III, we look at how scholars in a variety of fields have
described the changes in contemporary governance. The main theme in
the literature is the fragmentation of state sovereignty and the
consequent multiplication in the number of agencies and forms of power
that are active in the management of social systems. There is also fairly
wide agreement that it no longer makes sense to conceive of the state as
the monopolist of governance. Once it was dogma that our collective
world was divided into two fundamentally different spheres: the public
sphere—which was the realm of governance, and the private sphere—
the realm of the governed. This crucial distinction has eroded. States do

5. ROBERTO UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 8-10 (Verso 1996).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 7
BURRIS_FINAL

4

1/25/2008 10:29:41 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:1

not enjoy a monopoly on governance, and themselves are often governed
by non-state actors.
It now makes more sense to describe our world as polycentric, with
multiple agencies and sites of governance that govern through a variety
of forms of power. Both public and private governance have substantial
collective effects, and in both forms there are important (though
different) kinds of democratic deficits between the stake people have in
decisions and their capacity to influence or be protected from them.
This is as true at the international level (where the proliferation of nonstate governing actors has been characterized as a “post-Westphalian”
regime) as it is at the local (where resource-poor governments and nongovernmental organizations struggle to cope with the externalities of a
global economy over which they have little or no control). Citizens are
enlisted in new governmental and hybrid institutions to oversee
community policing, set local budgets, and monitor public expenditures.
Throughout the literature, there is discussion of the governing power of
transnational corporations. Non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”)
and foundations, though not generally as wealthy or effective as
corporations, are also vital governors at all levels. There is no mistaking
their expanding role in setting health priorities and providing services.
“Dark networks,” like Al Qaida or organized crime syndicates, are also
seen as agencies of governance.
None of this means that states are no longer important governors.
Many states retain decision-making powers in many spheres. Moreover,
states are deliberately sharing power as a means of exercising it. Much
of this falls under the umbrella of “partnership” approaches to
governance, wherein the state attempts to maintain a hand on the tiller,
steering governance processes in the public interest. Even where states
are not decision-makers in governance, they typically remain powerful
transmitters and implementers of decisions made by others.
Complexity, diversity, and particularity drive accounts of
governance today. The structure of governance is most commonly
described in network terms. Writers point to phenomena as diverse as
the Internet, public-private partnerships, markets, informal policy
networks at the international level, and “whole of government”
initiatives as examples of networked governance in action. Though
there are differences in how the network metaphor is used, network
accounts of governance tend to emphasize the importance of information
flow as a means and measure of good governance. Those that have, and
can use, information are at a significant advantage over those that are cut
off from information or unable to gather or use it effectively.
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The fracturing of governance has led to an explosion of interest in
the tools of governance. Force, which the Hobbesian state was designed
to constrain, continues to be a tool of both state and non-state
governance. Money is also a staple. At the same time, scholars have
been extremely successful in highlighting how governance may be
accomplished through “the regulation of social meaning.”6 Information
is proposed hopefully as a prime tool for constraining and replacing
these traditional means of exercising power.7 New institutions and
practices of deliberation, and better mobilization of local knowledge and
capacity, are pursued as means of making governance systems fairer and
more efficient.
Our review finds that writers across disciplines consistently discuss
three key variables of governance change and innovation:
Shifts in the institutions exercising governance control. There is an
apparent shift of the locus of control as new institutions emerge and
others decline in influence or disappear.
Changes in the methods of power. Governance is changing as
governors find new ways to project power towards other governors and
individuals in the system.
Changes in the nature or effectiveness of constraints on governors.
Governance systems change with variation in the potency of social
norms, institutional checks and balances, and technologies of
accountability and transparency.
Governance is not just changing, but, many scholars argue, is also
in a state of poor health. The diagnoses of the causes of these problems
differ, as therefore do the prescriptions for practical remedies. Much of
the difference in opinion hinges on expectations of the state. Some see
the state as too weak, and needing to be strengthened. To others, the
state remains too strong, too undemocratic, and therefore needs to be
better constrained or stripped of some of its jurisdiction. A number of
scholars have argued that old models of governance are paralyzed, and

6. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
Foucault is primary source for this sort of thinking, yet one must be careful about drawing on
Foucault in this discussion. Most of the literature we review is frankly positivist and
instrumentalist, devoted to governance as a tool for doing things. The literature follows Foucault in
his recognition of the decentralized, social character of power, but is far less attentive to the
problematization element of Foucault’s governmentality framework. For an excellent discussion of
new governance from a Foucaultian governmentality perspective, see Nikolas Rose, Government
and Control, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 321 (2000).
7. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE INFORMATION AGE,
ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (2d. ed. 2000); Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, DirectlyDeliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUROP. L. J. 313 (1997).
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need to be replaced, while some have been concerned that new modes of
governance are increasingly exploited by the strong at the expense of the
weak. While it is not our purpose in this paper to offer an intellectual
history of the recent move to governance,8 we do briefly highlight two
fundamental critiques of state-centered governance that seem to appear
throughout the governance literature: that “old” institutions of traditional
state governance are no longer working very well, and that a principal
reason for this is, as it were, epistemological—social systems have
become too complex, diverse, and particular for centralized, top-down
governance to manage.
Part IV examines efforts to remake governance over the past twenty
years. These may be separated into two “genres” of reform, reflecting
contrasting views of the proper, or feasible, role of the state:
“reinvention of government” and “reinvention of governance.”
Reinventing government consists in efforts to improve state regulatory
capacity with new tools, mentalities and institutions. Its emblematic
expression comes in strategies that devolve the “rowing” of governance
(providing services) to non-state agencies, while retaining the “steering”
(specifying the goals) within traditional state institutions. If reinventing
government is a matter of partnership between public and private agents,
reinventing governance can be thought of as a divorce. Reinventing
governance uses some of the same methods of power, but focuses on
innovation governors that may act with little or no connection to the
state. The key distinction between reinventing government and
reinventing governance seems to be the ceding of true power to nonstate actors. New governance institutions and practices cannot flourish
unless new governors are given real control over budgets and priorities.
Reinventing government has had some successes, but is no panacea.
Reinventing governance has proven to be an exciting concept, put into
practice in a variety of interesting ways, but its broader effects remain a
matter of debate.
In Part V, we conclude with some critical observations about
contemporary scholarship on governance innovation.
The most
important question is the extent to which the reports of the death of the
state have been exaggerated. Much of the impetus (and, to be fair, the
creativity) in the new governance literature comes from the claim that
top-down, state rule is often failing, which means both that the state
cannot be counted on to deliver crucial governance goods and that it

8. For an ambitious attempt to do so, ignore the unfortunate coinage in the title and see
Lobel, supra note 2.
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really cannot stand in the way of democratic innovation. A second
concern has to do with the centrality of local democracy in the
innovation literature.
Are advocates of innovation idealizing
participatory democracy at the lowest possible level of social
organization? The literature often suggests as much, in spite of the wellknown perils of localism. Finally, there is the relation of research to
practice and the importance of implementation factors on any sort of
governance innovation. With a topic as complex as this, the “correct”
description of governance in theoretical or empirical terms is an
infinitely receding goal. We need both theoretical and empirical tools,
but the more important issue is the prescription: what should governance
become and how should it get there? In the literature we review, we see
many examples of theory and data being moved into practice, on scales
both large and small. We also see too many instances of good theory
becoming good practice—and then failing for lack of social investment
for sustainability and scale-up.
II. DEFINING GOVERNANCE
There is little disagreement that governance is changing, but what
“governance” means and what sorts of changes are occurring are not
always specified. Governance has become a popular topic, and so risks
becoming a point of false rhetorical convergence, a term that means all
things to all people.9 We begin by adopting a definition of governance
to ground this article.10 Aiming for a level of abstraction on which we

9. Bovaird, supra note 3; Mark Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes, Searching for Civil Society:
Changing Patterns of Governance in Britain, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 41 (2003) [hereinafter Bevir &
Rhodes, Searching]; MARK BEVIR & R.A.W. RHODES, INTERPRETING BRITISH GOVERNANCE
(Routledge 2003) [hereinafter BEVIR & RHODES, INTERPRETING]; Mark Bevir, R.A.W Rhodes &
Patrick Weller, Traditions of Governance: Interpreting the Changing Role of the Public Sector, 81
PUB. ADMIN. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Bevir, Rhodes & Weller, Traditions].
10. There are many definitions of governance in many literatures. See, e.g., Dodgson & Lee,
supra note 3; OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 3; UN-HABITAT, supra note 3; Kooiman, supra
note 3; COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 3. In the broadest sense, the essence of
modern purposive governance is captured in Guillaume de la Perrière’s famous statement in
Mirroire Politique: “the right disposition of things, arranged so as to achieve convenient ends.”
Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87,
94 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991) [hereinafter Foucault,
Governmentality). The earliest modern practitioner incarnations of the concept of “governance”
pertained to the management of the population and economy as entities, the internal characteristics
and processes of which were rendered conceptually available by the advent of the statistical
sciences. Thus, statistics made it possible for practitioners to think in terms of where the population
or economy stood on aggregate measures (i.e. empirical "norms") and, by extension, where they
would like these aggregates to be on the same measures (i.e., desired "ends"). "Governance"
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thereby became the "rational" affair of systematic observation, policy design, implementation,
measurement, and adjustment towards closing the gap between norms and desired ends.
Contemporarily, "good governance" in the field of economic and social development—epitomized
in the language and practices of such international agencies as the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization—is orientated around the twin tracks of enhancing
the efficiency of the state administration (i.e., combating corruption and engaging "governmental
rightsizing") coupled with so-called "second-generation reforms" to build the critical physical
infrastructure and promote the individual skills and collective capacities necessary for the
development of health, security, and industry under the banner of "universal human rights." See
Kees Van Kersbergen & Frans Van Waarden, ‘Governance’ as a Bridge Between Disciplines:
Cross-Disciplinary Inspiration Regarding Shifts in Governance and Problems of Governability,
Accountability and Legitimacy, 43 EUR. J. POL. RES. 143-45 (2004) Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay
& Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters V: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators
for 1996-2005 (World Bank 2006), available at http://econ.worldbank.org (follow “Document
Search” hyperlink; search for “Governance V Kaufmann”).
With respect to the social sciences, governance as an object of study is approached in a variety of
ways. Thematically, it can be said that differences in the usage of the term are a matter of emphasis
more than substance. Universally, it is acknowledged that governance entails a set of both
repressive and constitutive processes oriented towards shaping outcomes that extend beyond the
state. Nevertheless, commentators differ on the relative importance they assign to the state versus
other agencies, and repressive versus constitutive forms of power, in processes of governance.
Commentators representing different academic perspectives also differ in terms of the level at which
they focus their analysis in keeping with the "conceptual legacy" of their particular research
traditions. Thus, "international relations" scholars have come to understand "governance" in terms
of “systems of rule … that sustain mechanisms designed to ensure [a collectivity’s] safety,
prosperity, coherence, stability, and continuance.” “[I]nternational collectivities” are not limited to
the state or state-sanctioned international institutions but include other entities such as international
non-governmental organizations. See James N. Rosenau, Change, Complexity and Governance in
Globalizing Space, in DEBATING GOVERNANCE: AUTHORITY, STEERING AND DEMOCRACY, 167, 171
(Jon Pierre ed., Oxford University Press 2000). Another usage of the term “governance” is derived
from the “network studies” stream of political science. This literature tends to see governance in
terms of the tendency of networks of governmental players to derive both formal and informal
protocols for interactive and independent conduct through the “messy actualities” of partisan
brokerage, and more “ideological” modes of deliberation. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Coping with
Tragedies of the Commons, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 493 (1999), available at
http://plato.acadiau.ca/COURSES/pols/grieve/3883/readings/ostrom_commons_tragedy.pdf.
Similar themes are spoken in various streams of development studies literature. Françoise Barten et
al., Democratic Governance—Fairytale or Real Perspective? Lessons from Central America, 14
ENV’T AND URBANIZATION 129, 131 (2002), for example, argue that “governance expresses the
relationship that exists between the state and civil society with respect to problems and policies of
national interest.” Other authors working within this framework retain much of the flavor of
Barten’s definition, while moving beyond the collective envelope of the nation. Lars Kohlmorgen
observes that governance includes “the interplay of different institutional forms ranging from public
to private forms of regulation (with different logics of steering and action) and comprises the
interaction of different actors (with different power resources and interests).” LARS KOHLMORGEN,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE. THE ROLE OF THE WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD BANK AND UNAIDS 2-3 (German Overseas Institute 2005).
Further, given that “there is not only an increase of intergovernmental and international activities,
but also a significant [rise in] transnational activities [involving civil society and the private sector],
we can speak of global instead of international governance . . . [which entails] the totality of
collective regulations to deal with international and transnational interdependence problems.” Id.
Also very useful for our purposes is the "socio-legal" or "political sociological" treatment of the
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can move across many literatures, we take governance to mean “the
management of the course of events in the social system.”11 To the same
end, we will reduce the complexity of governance structures to three
main elements: institutions—organizational sites where governing
resources are gathered and mobilized (government agencies,
corporations, foundations, NGOs, street gangs);12 methods of power—
tools that governors use to project influence (deliberation, bribes,
military force, claims of legitimate right to rule, forum-shifting);13 and
constraints on governors—limitations on the freedom of action of
concept of "governance" developed in the "governmentality" literature that originates in the work of
Michel Foucault. Rather than approaching governance as a problem to be solved, Foucaultian work
understands the concept in terms of a conceptual category that shapes the ways in which we
subsequently look at and attempt to engage the world. See, e.g., H.K. Colebatch, Government and
Governmentality: Using Multiple Approaches to the Analysis of Government, 37 AUSTL. J. POL. SCI.
417 (2002); Rose, supra note 6.
11. See Scott Burris, Peter Drahos & Clifford Shearing, Nodal Governance, 30 AUSTL. J.
LEG. PHIL. 30 (2005).
12. See Teubner, supra note 4, at 10-13; Wayne Cameron, Public Accountability:
Effectiveness, Equity, Ethics, 63 AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 59 (2004); G. SHABBIR CHEEMA, BUILDING
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: GOVERNANCE REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2005); Vivien
Collingwood & Louis Logister, State of the Art: Addressing the INGO ‘Legitimacy Deficit’, 3 POL.
STUD. REV. 175 (2005); M. Shamsul Haque, Governance and Bureaucracy in Singapore:
Contemporary Reforms and Implications, 25 INT’L. POL. SCI. REV. 227 (2004); M. Shamsul Haque,
Governance Based on Partnership with NGOs: Implications for Development and Empowerment in
Rural Bangladesh, 70 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 271 (2004); THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE
AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 4 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002);
Spiro, supra note 4.
13. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Methods of Power for Development: Weapons of the Weak,
Weapons of the Strong, 26 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 297 (2004) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Methods]
(elaborating on the concept of “methods of power”); Spiro, supra note 4 (describing strategies used
by NGOs in international legal fora). Work in the field of public administration studies has been
especially useful in describing the practical tools of governance. See Rita Abrahamsen, The Power
of Partnerships in Global Governance, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 1453 (2004); Bovaird, supra note 3.
On broader theoretical issues addressing the nature and machinations of power behind tools and
techniques of governance, see various domains of socio-legal studies: Graham Burchell, Liberal
Government and Techniques of the Self, in FOUCAULT AND POLITICAL REASON: LIBERALISM, NEOLIBERALISM AND RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNMENT 19, 22 (Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne &
Nikolas Rose eds., 1996); BARBARA CRUIKSHANK, THE WILL TO EMPOWER: DEMOCRATIC
CITIZENS AND OTHER SUBJECTS 2 (Cornell University Press 1999); Foucault, Governmentality,
supra note 10, at 87-104; BARRY HINDESS, DISCOURSES OF POWER: FROM HOBBES TO FOUCAULT
(Blackwell Publishers 1996) (cataloging dominant scholarship on the concept of power); Nikolas
Rose, The Death of the Social? Refiguring the Territory of Government, 25 ECON. & SOC’Y. 327
(1996) [hereinafter Rose, Death of Social]; NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING
POLITICAL THOUGHT (1999) [hereinafter ROSE, POWERS]; Nikolas Rose & Peter Miller, Political
Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government, 43 BRIT. J. SOC. 173 (1992); see also Pierre
Bourdieu, Epilogue: On the Possibility of a Field of World Sociology, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A
CHANGING SOCIETY (Pierre Bourdieu & James S. Coleman eds., Westview Press 1991) (working in
field of “reflexive sociology”); accord PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOIC WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO
REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY (University of Chicago Press 1992).
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governors that may arise from laws (like a constitution or treaty),
competition from other governors (as in a market), or from culture
(social norms).14
Much of what is meant by governance has to do with manipulating
the elements of governance to achieve effective and efficient
management—i.e., governance that works. In the political science
literature (especially that associated with the science of public
administration), well-functioning management and control is referred to
as the “governability” of the system.15 A system of governance that is
high on governability is equipped with appropriate tools and capacities
to manage itself (e.g., clear lines of information transfer) and to
intervene effectively in various policy domains of interest (e.g., clear
and effective legal powers, adequate and well-managed resources, etc.).
There are on-going attempts to operationalize “good governance” in the
sense of accountable, honest administration of state business.16
Good governance is not merely about governability or
management, however. It also implies goals towards which systems are
being directed, and so governance as a process is inextricably linked to

14. See Jean Marc Coicaud, Reflections on International Organisations and International
Legitimacy: Constraints, Pathologies, and Possibilities, 53 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 523 (2001); RICHARD
A. FALK, THE DECLINING WORLD ORDER: AMERICA’S IMPERIAL GEOPOLITICS (Routledge 2004);
David Held, The Changing Contours of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Context
of Globalization, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: KEY DEBATES 17, 22 (Barry Holden ed., Routledge
2000); Björn Hettne, In Search of World Order, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON WORLD ORDER 6, 13 (Björn Hettne and Bertil Odén eds., 2002);
Teubner, supra note 4, at 10-13; Martin Hewson & Timothy J. Sinclair, The Emergence of Global
Governance Theory, in APPROACHES TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THEORY 3, 9 (Martin Hewson &
Timothy J. Sinclair eds., 1999); PETER MARDEN, THE DECLINE OF POLITICS: GOVERNANCE,
GLOBALIZATION, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (2003); Anthony McGrew, Power Shift: From National
Government to Global Governance? in A GLOBALISING WORLD? CULTURE, ECONOMICS, POLITICS
128, 162-63 (David Held ed., Routledge 2000); Craig N. Murphy, Global Governance: Poorly Done
and Poorly Understood, 76 INT’L AFFAIRS 789 (2000); John Gerard Ruggie, The United Nations
and Globalization: Patterns in Limits of Institutional Adaptation, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 301
(2003); Michael Zurn, Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems, 39 GOV’T. OPPOSITION 260
(2004); John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies, 34 WORLD DEV. 884
(2006); PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (New Press 2003); Colin Scott, Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A
Neglected Facet of Contemporary Governance, 29 J. L. & SOC’Y. 56 (2002).
15. Bovaird, supra note 3; Kees Van Kersbergen & Frans Van Waarden, supra note 10.
16. See, e.g., Daniel Kaufmann, Frannie Léautier & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance and the
City: An Empirical Exploration into Global Determinants of Urban Performance 2-40 (World Bank
2004); Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance
Indicators for 1996-2004 (World Bank 2005); Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, supra note 10; Jerry
Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance
in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 117 (Michael Dowdle
ed., 2006).
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normative questions of what the governor is seeking to accomplish.
Mussolini’s fascist regime famously made the trains run on time, but the
ends of his government were odious. Hence, “good governance” is not
just governance that works efficiently, but governance that works by fair
and open processes towards just and socially beneficial ends.17
In much of the literature there is a strong normative preference for
democracy as the essence of good governance.18 This reflects, in part,
the evident virtues of democracy as a mode of governance, or at least its
superiority to the alternatives, but as we will discuss further, it also
arises in many cases from an empirical proposition: modes of decisionmaking that enroll more diverse knowledge, and are subject to validation
of analyses through competition, are more likely to produce correct
answers more of the time.19
Much writing on governance is devoted to questions of its ends,
and, conversely, judgments about ends frequently influence assessments
of effectiveness in governance.20 Thus, for example, the imposition of
structural adjustment, or other rigorous policies aimed at promoting
long-term socioeconomic improvement, is seen by its proponents as the

17. Mashaw, supra note 16; Jens Steffek, Sources of Legitimacy Beyond the State: A View
from International Relations, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 81-82
(Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sands & Gunther Teubner eds., 2004) (“International governance
is likely to be regarded as legitimate when it is directed towards the agreed values of the
international community, and when it respects commonly shared procedural standards.”); cf.
Mashaw, supra note 16, at 117 (“at base, much of the dispute about accountability is a dispute about
what particular institutions are meant to do, not how accountable they are in the doing of it.”).
18. See CHEEMA, supra note 12 at 11, 16-17 (discussing the advantages of democracy, such
as sustainability, independence of media, and quality of institutions).
19. See, e.g., Cohen & Sabel, supra note 7 at 319. The idea of “enrollment” of governors is
an important topic in contemporary regulatory analysis. See Julia Black, Enrolling Actors in
Regulatory Systems: Examples from UK Financial Services, PUB. L. 2003, at 63.
20. This is especially the subject matter of normative political theory. See, for example,
Jürgen Habermas, who explicitly connects the question of norms to institutional design. See
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION VOLUME 1: REASON AND THE
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) [hereinafter
HABERMAS, VOLUME 1]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION VOLUME
2: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 60-62 (Thomas McCarthy
trans., Beacon Press 1987) [hereinafter HABERMAS, VOLUME 2]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (MIT
Press 1996) [hereinafter HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE
INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greif eds.,
MIT Press 1998) [hereinafter HABERMAS, STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY]; see also SEYLA
BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRITICAL THEORY
(Columbia University Press 1986); Boris Frankel, Confronting Neo-Liberal Régimes: The PostMarxist Embrace of Populism and Realpolitik, 226 NEW LEFT REV. 57 (1997); WILL KYMLICKA,
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (Oxford University Press
1998); Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, supra note10, at 156-60.
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epitome of good governance—willingness to impose short term pain for
long term gain—while its opponents see the archetype of unfair and
damaging top-down rule-making by outsiders.21 Canvassing, let alone
resolving, these sorts of ultimately substantive debates is beyond the
scope of this article.
III. WHO GOVERNS AND HOW? DESCRIBING CONTEMPORARY
GOVERNANCE
Despite differences in conceptual emphasis across the literature, it
is widely agreed that we are living in times of profound governance
transformation as a matter of empirical fact.22 The main theme to which
all the transformations in governance that we describe are ultimately
reducible is the fragmentation of state sovereignty and the consequent
multiplication of agencies and forms of power that are active in the
management of social systems. Once it was dogma that our collective
world was divided into two fundamentally different spheres: the public
sphere—the realm of governors, and the private sphere—the realm of
the governed. This crucial distinction is no longer accepted as an
accurate representation of the way things are.23 Much of the impetus
behind the current interest in governance seems to be a sense that the
normative goals that (in theory) once animated a state-centered account
of governance—equity, stability, accountability, transparency,
efficiency—are ever further from being achieved, making it important to
consider whether other descriptions of governance might guide us
towards governance practices that produce better results.24
There is also fairly wide agreement that the state-centered system of
governance has been replaced by some form of distributed governance,
in which governance power is spread among a wide range of actors of
21. See, e.g., TITUS ALEXANDER, UNRAVELLING GLOBAL APARTHEID: AN OVERVIEW OF
WORLD POLITICS (Polity Press 1996); NOAM CHOMSKY, 9-11 (1st ed. 2001); Jonathan Di John,
Economic Liberalization, Political Instability, and State Capacity in Venezuela, 26 INT’L POL. SCI.
REV. 107 (2005); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Norton & Co.
2002).
22. See COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 3; CASTELLS, supra note 7; UNHABITAT, supra note 3.
23. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 3; UN-HABITAT, supra
note 3.
24. On how our concepts are failing our normative objectives, see Clifford Shearing,
Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments, in DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY AND
THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY 11, 20-23 (Jennifer Wood & Benoît Dupont eds., Cambridge
University Press 2005); S.T. Akindele, The Concepts of Democracy and Governance: A
Theoretical and Empirical X-Ray of Their Linkage and Practical Application Within the Nigerian
Political Landscape, 6 J. SOC. SCI. 173 (2002); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 4.
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many different types.25 Very often the metaphor of the network is used
to capture the imagery of diffuse systems of governance involving
multiple nodes that interact in a wide variety of ways.26 The unity of the
network metaphor, however, masks diversity in how the concept is being
used across a range of literatures.27 The fracturing of governance has
likewise led to an explosion of interest in unpacking the tools of
governance—the means (ranging from controlling resource and
information flows to influencing culture through setting the abstract
terms for debate) through which governing decisions can be influenced
and effectuated.28
The harmony in the literature in acknowledging profound shifts in
the ways in which governance is organized and delivered goes sour on
the question of what these agreed changes mean in terms of their origins
and practical impacts, and whether they are positive or not. Few think
the state is in any danger of disappearing, and fewer still that the
disappearance of the state would be a good thing.29 Many who
25. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 2, at 344-45 (describing changes in the global political
economy that militate toward a new paradigm of governance); Black, supra note 19, at 64-66
(describing the emergence of a “decentred” account of regulation); James N. Rosenau, Governing
the Ungovernable: The Challenge of a Global Disaggregation of Authority, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE
88, 89 (2007) (discussing “proliferation of spheres of authority”).
26. See CASTELLS, supra note 7 (discussing the “network society”); Burris, Drahos &
Shearing, supra note 11 (discussing “nodal governance”). On “networked governance,” see Bevir
and Rhodes, Searching, supra note 9; BEVIR AND RHODES, INTERPRETING, supra note 9; Bevir,
Rhodes & Weller, Traditions, supra note 9.
27. For a discussion of this point, see L. Johnston & Clifford Shearing, Models of 21stCentury Security Governance: Reflections on the Fallacy of Nodal-Network Equivalence (Draft,
cited with permission).
28. See, e.g., Braithwaite, Methods, supra note 13 (describing “methods of power” weak states
can use to regulate powerful ones); Jane E. Fountain, Toward a Theory of Federal Bureaucracy for
the Twenty-First Century, in GOVERNANCE.COM: DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 117
(E.C. Kamarck, and J. Joseph S. Nye ed., 2002) (describing changes in ideal bureaucratic strategy
flowing from new information technologies). On the forms of power contests that are waged
between participants in networked practices of governance, see BEVIR & RHODES, INTERPRETING,
supra note 9. For a similar analysis of power flows within nodal assemblages, see Benoît Dupont,
Power Struggles in the Field of Security: Implications for Democratic Transformation, in
DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY 86 (Jennifer Wood & Benoît Dupont
eds., 2006). For a generic discussion on the modalities of power that actors mobilize in order to
contest and shape governance (as well as broader social “outcomes”), see BOURDIEU & WACQUANT,
supra note 13. For the more specific analysis of constitutive forms of power that colonize the mind
to produce citizens of various sensibilities, and the “governmentality scholars” that have drawn
upon the social theory of Michel Foucault to analyze the character of neoliberal programs of
“governance at-a-distance,” see Rose, Death of Social, supra note 13; ROSE, POWERS, supra note
13; Burchell, supra note 13.
29. For example, in the policy domain of policing, see Ian Loader & Neil Walker, Necessary
Virtues: The Legitimate Place of the State in the Production of Security, in DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY
AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY 165 (Jennifer Wood & Benoît Dupont eds., 2006); Lucia
Zedner, Too Much Security? 31 INT’L. J. SOC. L. 155 (2003). See generally Adam Crawford,
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document the weakness or failure of the state look to strengthening the
state, or state-based international institutions, as the response.30
Conversely, there is widespread concern that distributed governance
systems are being dominated by actors with greater resources to
recognize and game new governance structures to suit their own (shortterm, we would argue) ends. We canvas these points in this section.
A. The King is Dead
Ever since Thomas Hobbes, the state has figured for many thinkers
on governance as the one essential decision-maker and coordinator, the
one center of governance that could pacify the war of all against all
through the application of repressive sovereign force.31 This set of
rhetorical aspirations reached its institutional apotheosis in the middle
decades of the 20th century, but has been in accelerating decline ever
since.32 Indeed, it is now seen as a grossly inaccurate caricature, both of
who does governance and how governance is done.33 In the context of
accelerating movement of information, capital, and people in globalizing
times, the primary envelope of collectivization has ceased to be the state:
all manner of non-state spaces (both real and virtual) have opened up
and expanded, presenting challenges and opportunities for governance
that have been seized by non-state actors.34 It is not simply that the

Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State? Steering, Rowing and Anchoring the
Provision of Policing and Security, 10 THEORETICAL CRIMINOL. 449 (2006) (analyzing how new
governance literature assesses the state of the state).
30. See Loader & Walker, supra note 29; IAN LOADER & NEIL WALKER, CIVILIZING
SECURITY (Cambridge University Press 2007).
31. See HINDESS, supra note 13. For many scholars, the public-private distinction has never
described reality; it has always been an inspirational, rather than an empirical, distinction. See
Michael Kempa, Philip Stenning & Jennifer Wood, Policing Communal Spaces: A Reconfiguration
of the ‘Mass Private Property’ Hypothesis, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 562 (2004); Andrew Von Hirsch
& Clifford Shearing, Exclusion From Public Space, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 77-96 (Andrew Von Hirsch, David Garland & Alison Wakefield
eds., 2000); see also Dietz, supra note 3, at 1907 (noting that the simple dichotomy between central
government control and property rules ignores a long tradition of governing commons through
social institutions). However, this observation should not be used to blind us to the fact that there
has been meaningful change in governance practice that directly relates to both the empirical and
the inspirational value of the public-private distinction.
32. See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 4, at 13-15 (discussing the significance of globalization for
governance).
33. Id.; Abrahamsen, supra note 13; CASTELLS, supra note 7; RHODES, supra note 3; Lobel,
supra note 2.
34. Centre for Globalisation and Governance, Global Health Governance: Institutional
Change and the Interfaces Between Global and Local Politics in the Poverty-Oriented Fight of
Diseases, German Overseas Institute (2004-05) (prepared by Wolfgang Hein et al.,) [hereinafter,
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public and private spheres have become blurred or that there are now
hybrid spheres. The distinction itself is no longer valid. Rather than
living in a world in which states exercise a monopoly on governance in
the public interest, we now live in an unmistakably polycentric world
with multiple agencies and sites of governance. Such agencies and sites
govern through a variety of forms of power, and largely in their own
interests, but with far-reaching collective impacts. In the most dramatic
instances, private corporations may, for all intents and purposes, be the
government in some communities.35 More commonly, non-state actors
are simply important competitors for governing control, able in many
instances to manage events in their own interests, and in some instances
to do so through the governance of states themselves.36 Even the state
no longer stands as a unitary Leviathan, but is itself seen as an
assemblage of nodes or networks working with more or less
independence, and frequently at cross-purposes or loggerheads. In the
name of reinventing government, the state may be in the business of
actively shedding governance authority to non-state or hybrid bodies.37
The impetus for new governance paradigms is the fear that a
continued focus upon the state and the mechanisms of repressive
sovereign authority is undermining our ability to govern effectively in a
whole variety of domains,38 including the environment,39 international

Institutional Change and Interfaces]; KOHLMORGEN, supra note 10; Eeva Ollila, Global Health
Priorities—Priorities of the Wealthy? 1 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH (2005).
35. See, e.g., Amy Sinden, Harms Power and Responsibility: Why Human Rights Should
Address Corporate Environmental Wrongs, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom
Campbell eds., 2007) (describing governance by Texaco and Freeport-McMoran in extraction
reserves).
36. For example, Orly Lobel describes the current terrain of governance as characterized by:
increased participation of nonstate actors, stakeholder collaboration, diversity and
competition, decentralization and subsidiarity, integration of policy domains, flexibility
and noncoerciveness, adaptability and dynamic learning, and legal orchestration among
proliferated norm-generating entities. The challenge is to understand these dimensions of
the new legal model as operating together, along with the contingencies and internal
debates over meaning and bricolage that inevitably arise in an emerging school of
thought.
Lobel, supra note 2, at 348, 371-404.
37. See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 3 (discussing transnational networks of state agencies);
Burris, Drahos & Shearing, supra note 11 (describing governments as nodal assemblages); Colin
Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J. L. & SOC’Y 38 (2000) (mapping accountability
structures in government).
38. B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, supra note10.
39. Thierry Desrues, Governability and Agricultural Policy in Morocco: Functionality and
Limitations of the Reform Discourse, 10 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 39 (2005); Andrew E.G. Jonas &
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development,40 and health.41 In the international relations literature, for
example, commentators have proposed the emergence of a “postWestphalian” era in which international governance is no longer a club
reserved for states.42
International NGOs, such as Amnesty
International, are able to mobilize popular opinion against particular
states to constrain and shape state action by issuing reports that they
systematically amplify through their access to global information
In some instances, NGOs effectively participate in
media.43
international state governance by providing expert “diplomats” to
represent weak states in international negotiations.44 Transnational
corporations wield both political power within states and the weight of a
threat to move capital. Such capital movement influences global policy
and constrains individual states from pursuing autonomous
socioeconomic and environmental policy agendas that are unfriendly to
the maximization of corporate profits.45 The World Health Organization
(“WHO”), one of the weakest international agencies, was able to govern
China’s response to SARS because of its ability to enroll the global
media to spread the word which in turn spurred global businesses to
withhold investment.46 None of this is fully comprehensible within a
paradigm of exclusive state governance in the international sphere.47
Gavin Bridge, Governing Nature: The Re-Regulation of Resources, Land Use Planning, and Nature
Conservation, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 958 (2003).
40. Mamadou Diawara, Globalization, Development Politics, and Local Knowledge, 15 INT’L
SOC. 361 (Maria Arnason trans., 2000).
41. Ilona Kickbusch, Action on Global Health: Addressing Global Health Governance
Challenges, 119 PUB. HEALTH 969 (2005); Jon Cohen, The New World of Global Health, 311 SCI.
162 (2006); Ilona Kickbusch, Mapping the Future of Public Health: Action on Global Health, 97
CANADIAN J. PUB. HEALTH/REVUE CANADIENNE DE SANTE PUBLIQUE 6 (2006).
42. See, e.g., Fidler, supra note 2; STIGLITZ, supra note 21.
43. Peter Leigh Taylor, In the Market But Not of It: Fair Trade Coffee and Forest
Stewardship Council Certification as Market-Based Social Change, 33 WORLD DEV. 129 (2005);
Spiro, supra note 4; Kal Raustiala & Natalie Bridgeman, Nonstate Actors in the Global Climate
Regime,
UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 07-29 Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028603.
44. See Spiro, supra note 4.
45. For example, state government policies throughout Southern Africa have been turned in
the direction of conditions favorable for the maintenance of the primary resource extraction
economy most beneficial for major transnational corporations. Elias K. Bongmba, Reflections on
Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance, 30 J. S. AFR. STUD. 291 (2004); Pádraig Carmody, Between
Globalisation and (Post) Apartheid: The Political Economy of Restructuring in South Africa, 28 J.
S. AFR. STUD. 255 (2002).
46. Jason Sapsin et al., SARS and International Legal Preparedness, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 155
(2004); Jacques deLisle, Atypical Pneumonia and Ambivalent Law and Politics: SARS and the
Response to SARS in China, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 193 (2004).
47. See Chief Emeka Anyaoku, The End of Multilateralism: Whither Global Governance? 93
THE ROUND TABLE 193 (2004); Chimni, supra note 38; Ruggie, supra note 14; Zurn, supra note 14.
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The eclipse of the Leviathan is seen with equal clarity at the local
level. A much discussed example is the proliferation of “mass private
property” and other forms of new communal space that look like
traditional public spaces, but are privately owned and regulated. These
spaces include malls, golf courses, theme parks, and secured corporate
and residential complexes and towers.48 Owners of such property take
full advantage of the legal rights that accrue to property ownership—and
of the inapplicability of constitutional limitations on action that apply
only to public authorities—to set and enforce behavior and surveillance
standards within the space they own.49 This has seen the explosion in
the size and role played by the paid private security industry globally
over the last three decades.50 These agencies have become the dominant
force in the process of “the governance of security” at the local and
international levels over this time period, which has seen much of the
business of “policing” turn directly in service of the interests of
wealthier classes.51 Of great import is the fact that private security
agencies often mobilize the public police to do their bidding. Absent
such an invitation, the nature of private property law makes it difficult
for the public police to enter and intervene. Thus, in an important sense,
the public police are themselves governed by the private security
industry and their employers in the expanses of mass private property
that dot the contemporary landscape.
As the above examples illustrate, it is not just that the state now
shares governance with “private” actors in policy networks that remain

48. Clifford Shearing, and others, have told the story of how shopping districts on public
streets morphed into malls that gradually refashioned themselves from public squares to “mass
private property”—a form of space that admits the public, but on terms set by the owner. A recent
refinement is the creation of local business improvement districts in the old shopping areas; these
“private” authorities have the power to tax and field their own police, among other state-like
functions. Shearing, supra note 24.
49. Kempa et al., supra note 31; Von Hirsch & Shearing, supra note 31.
50. TERESA P. R. CALDEIRA, CITY OF WALLS: CRIME, SEGREGATION, AND CITIZENSHIP IN
SAO PAULO (University of California Press 2000); Teresa P. R. Caldeira, Building Up Walls: The
New Pattern of Spatial Segregation in Sao Paulo, 48 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 55 (1996); Kempa et al.,
supra note 31; Clifford Shearing & Phillip Stenning, Private Security: Implications for Social
Control, 30 SOC. PROBLEMS 493 (1983) [hereinafter Shearing & Stenning, Private Security];
Clifford Shearing & Phillip Stenning, Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications, in
CRIME AND JUSTICE, AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH, VOL. 3 193-245, (Michael Tonry &
Norval Morris eds., 1981) [hereinafter Shearing & Stenning, Modern Private Security]; ALLISON
WAKEFIELD, SELLING SECURITY: THE PRIVATE POLICING OF PUBLIC SPACE (Willan Publishing
2003). Even the government uses private security guards, as the role of Blackwater in protecting
American diplomats unflatteringly illustrates. Eric Schmitt & David Rohde, 2 Reports Assail State
Dept. Role in Iraq Security, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007.
51. Shearing & Stenning, Private Security, supra note 50.
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state-coordinated. It is now recognized that the state itself is governed
by non-state actors—which makes it possible to speak of the rise of
“private government” in contemporary systems of governance.52 This
highlights the analytic point that useful accounts of, and programs for
engagement with, governance must consider the cases in which the state
is following orders, in which it may be a transmitter, rather than maker,
of decisions. The fact that a government in a nodal world is
democratically elected has, on this basis, proved to be no guarantee that
it will realize broadly based, rather than narrowly partisan, agendas.53
None of this means that states are no longer important. Many states
remain extremely potent in many spheres. Through disseminated
governance mechanisms, some scholars argue that the functional
capacity of the state to direct its influence into an expanding range of
matters of everyday life is in fact increased, with sometimes positive and
sometimes negative results.54 What is more, repressive power has not
been dropped from the arsenal of tools deployed by state governments in
the process of governance. This is especially the case where efforts to
govern at-a-distance through the light touch of constitutive power break
down, such as in the case of controlling hard-to-reach groups—notably
the economic underclass of marginalized, undereducated, and thereby
unemployable persons, persons that have no stake in conforming to, or
supporting, the mainstream governance order.55
In the context of growing security concerns in a post-9/11 world,
where state governments have awoken to the apparent threat posed by an
expanding global underclass whose ears are receptive to violent radical
ideology, the direct use of coercive power by state authorities and
through private proxy is increasing.56 But the end of the state monopoly
poses the fundamental question, both theoretical and practical, of how

52. Freeman, supra note 3; STEWART MACAULEY, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (1995);
David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 12 (2005); R.A.W. Rhodes, The Unholy Trinity and Network Governance, Public Lecture,
Australian National University (August 2005) [hereinafter Rhodes, Network Governance speech].
We do not begin to explore the enormous literature on corporate governance, much of which
concerns itself with the structure and operation of private regimes of rule.
53. See Bovaird, supra note 3; Di John, supra note 21; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden,
supra note10.
54. See Shearing, supra note 24, at 25 (noting that, in some important respects, the
government has strengthened under a steering-rowing model).
55. See HINDESS, supra note 13; Barry Hindess, Not at Home in the Empire, 7 SOC.
IDENTITIES 363 (2001); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (1995).
56. See Conor O’Reilly & Graham Ellison, Eye Spy Private High: Reconceptualising High
Policing Theory, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 641 (2006).
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private government is to be conducted with decent regard for the
collective interest. The answer to that question begins with a description
of non-state governance.
B. Long Live the Extended Royal Family
States exist today as one nodal assemblage among many in an
increasingly complex field of governance relationships and practices. In
the context of the fragmentation of sovereignty in globalizing times, the
reach of such non-state actors extends beyond any type of clearly
delimited private sphere into a wide variety of areas of collectivization
that have broad impact on the social and physical environment.
Governance is a multilevel affair,57 and therefore we can expect to see
the proliferation in involvement of non-state actors in processes of
governance at the local, national, and inter/supra-national levels of
collectivization.
So who else governs? This is an empirical question that has
received considerable attention in the literature. The most influential
and powerful agencies involved in contemporary governance are without
a doubt those representing corporate power at the local, national, and
inter/supranational levels.58 The mechanisms through which these forms
of non-state agencies govern are most clearly spelled out in the global
business regulation literature, which provides detailed analysis of the
legal and cultural conditions of possibility that have enabled
corporations to seize an increasing number of the levers of governability
away from public authorities. As commentators like John Braithwaite,
Peter Drahos, Colin Scott, and David Levi-Faur have pointed out, much
of this has turned on the creative use of private property concepts in
contract, patent, and intellectual property law.59 For example, the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) agreement in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) has rendered it
possible for pharmaceutical conglomerates to claim patents over
remedies derived from plants and other biotic matter, even though such

57. Institutional Chance and Interfaces, supra note 34; KOHLMORGEN, supra note 10.
58. Freeman, supra note 3; MACAULEY, supra note 52; Shearing, supra note 24; Bevir &
Rhodes, Searching, supra note 9; BEVIR & RHODES, INTERPRETING, supra note 9, at 83-86; Bevir,
Rhodes & Weller, Traditions, supra note 9.
59. See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14; JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS,
GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000); Scott, supra note 14; Levi-Faur, supra note 52; Moran,
supra note 2.
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remedies themselves are originally sourced from local indigenous
knowledge.60
Non-commercial NGOs are also exerting a great deal of influence
in contemporary governance.61 Although these bodies are not directly
state-sponsored or incorporated in the traditional sense of profit-making
institutions, they derive substantial authority to govern states through
their capacity to mobilize and shape public opinion through the
publication of reports and access to the world’s media. Examples
include work in human rights, access to medicines, and sustainable trade
and agriculture, all of which are kept on the global agenda by NGOs and
NGO networks.62 Foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, with their enormous wealth, virtually have taken control of
the agenda in certain topics.63
In addition to autonomous activity, both corporate organizations
and NGOs have been mobilized to participate in collective governance
processes through mainstream partnership approaches to governance.
The public-private partnership has been an emblematic device in neoliberal systems of governance that see the state attempting to govern ata-distance by harnessing the ordering capacity of markets and other
autonomous local orders. Within this framework, contributors to
partnership governance often are authorized explicitly in law, or in
contract, to undertake service provision functions in the public interest.64
Often, these agencies are, at least partially, governed by the state through
quasi-independent oversight bodies,65 but scholars have also observed
the converse “trend, towards systematic oversight of government (akin
to regulation) carried out by private (i.e. non-state or non-governmental)
actors.”66 No domain of public policy has been excluded from such
devolution of service planning and delivery: as we have mentioned, even
in the domain of “the governance of human security,” thought in most
liberal democratic theory to be part of the basic justification for a state,
60. Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance
Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401 (2004).
61. Collingwood & Logister, supra note 12; Haque, supra note 12; Spiro, supra note 4.
62. See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, The Quest for Global Governance in Intellectual Property and
Public Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 363 (2004);
Joanne Csete, Lessons Not Learned: Human Rights Abuses and HIV/AIDS in the Russian
Federation, 16 HUM. RTS. WATCH (2004); Spiro, supra note 4.
63. See Cohen, supra note 41 (discussing the influence of the Gates Foundation in global
health governance).
64. Abrahamsen, supra note 13; Freeman, supra note 3; Haque, supra note 12.
65. See RHODES, supra note 3.
66. Scott, supra note 14 (citing, e.g., the contracting out of audits of government activities to
private auditors).
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public authorities have engaged partnership approaches to policing in
collaboration with local citizens and the paid private security industry
(and have seen corporate authorities take control over their own policing
autonomously). The effect is that much of the “policing” today is done
by non-state actors.67
“Dark networks,” such as organized crime or terror syndicates,
exert influence on contemporary governance principally through force
and the threat of force.68 These actors powerfully contribute to the
spread of the “risk mentality” that dominates contemporary life. As
scholars such as Ulrich Beck69 and David Garland70 have detailed, in the
context of uncertain global futures and the apparent failure of science to
deliver on the “modernist dream” of a well-administered social and
physical environment, individuals increasingly have become fearful of
potential and unknown harms. In turn, these fears often are fanned
further by politicians for partisan and electoral benefit.71 Thus, Al
Qaeda governs the West through actual and threatened violence that
produces both specific and generalized fear that is associated with
xenophobic reactions that further help Al Qaeda’s cause to turn the
balance of the planet violently against the West.
C. What Does Distributed Governance Look Like?
Descriptions of distributed governance have been dominated by the
image of the network and the consequent “de-centering” of governance.
The use of the network idea ranges considerably in analytic rigor, from
67. See Kempa et al., supra note 31; WAKEFIELD, supra note 50. Governance scholars have
worked to define generic elements of regulation and governance in order to separate activities from
actors, which is essential to understanding distributed governance. Thus, Julia Black wrote:
[I]n challenging the notion that regulation is a uniquely or even primarily state activity,
decentred analyses throw into question what ‘regulation’ is. If we are to pursue the
analysis of regulation as a form of contemporary governance a broad and non-state
centred understanding of regulation needs to be developed. In response, regulation is
understood here to be the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others
according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly
identified outcome or outcomes, and which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting,
information-gathering and behaviour-modification.
Black, supra note 19, at 65.
68. Jörg Raab & H. Brinton Milward, Dark Networks as Problems, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 413 (2003).
69. ULRICH BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY (Polity Press 1999).
70. David Garland, The Rise of Risk, in RISK AND MORALITY 48-86 (Richard V. Ericson &
Aaron Doyle eds., 2003); David Garland, The Culture of High Crime Societies: Some Preconditions
of Recent ‘Law and Order’ Policies, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 347 (2000) [hereinafter Garland, High
Crime].
71. Garland, High Crime, supra note 70.
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the metaphorical to the mathematical, but the thrust is that governance
systems can best be understood as being comprised of many more or less
independent governors and providers that are linked in some way that
enables them to project influence across social space.72
Networks can be highly stable, but in the network model, there is
also an inherent expectation of flux, with institutions being capable of
rapidly making new connections and abandoning old ones. As we
discuss later, the fascination with networks also has an epistemic
element, the belief that networks are the expression of a social
complexity that defies comprehension by traditional, centralized, and
government-centered forms of governance. To illustrate the variety and
richness of the many literatures touching on networked governance, we
describe here several leading accounts.
i. The Network Society
The most elaborate account of networks as a feature of social
organization is found in the work of Manuel Castells.73 For him,
networks have become the primary mode of social and institutional
organization in conditions of “advanced information economy” and “late
modernity.”74 In such an economy, the capacity to generate, process,
and manage information fundamentally determines productivity and
competitiveness, and so much of governance is centered on, and
conducted through, the management of information flow in networks.75
A critical feature of Castells’ work is to ponder the broader social,
political, and economic impacts of the spread of different forms of
information sharing networks, and his ideas have influenced scholars
particularly concerned with governance.
In its strongest form, the network account of social organization
72. Julia Black writes:
[W]hat ‘networks’ are contested. The term is used in a number of ways ranging from a
loose metaphor to describe a constellation of actors that seem to interact in some way,
through to being a hard-edged mode of analysis of the extent and depth of social
interlinkages using formal mathematical modelling. Nonetheless, networks are generally
seen to be qualitatively different from markets and hierarchies, contracts and
organisation, and not to be simply a hybrid form, and to possess three central
characteristics. These are that they involve a variety of actors each pursuing their own
goals, between whom there are relatively stable sets of inter-relationships, and critically,
who are dependent on one another for resources.
Black, supra note 19, at 85 (citations omitted).
73. CASTELLS, supra note 7; Manuel Castells, Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the
Network Society, 51 BRIT. J. SOC. 5 (2000) [hereinafter Castells, Materials].
74. See generally CASTELLS, supra note 7.
75. Castells, Materials, supra note 73.
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takes as an empirical truth the proposition that the state is not, and for a
variety of practical reasons cannot be, a governance monopolist. Partly,
this is because governments are being pushed aside or bypassed.
“Governments today are competing with private entities for power,
influence, and representation.”76 More fundamentally, old-fashioned
“brick and mortar” institutions cannot manage networks that are
complex to start with and capable of rapid reconfiguration. While
centralized institutions have a role, “[t]he task for the architects of the
post cold war governance system is to recognize and take advantage of
the complex synergies between networks of actors operating at multiple
levels of international politics.”77
Whether this is a good or bad thing for most of the world’s
population remains open to question. Leaving aside for a moment the
decisive question of network access, the literature veers between
excitement at the potential for governance reform and the fear that the
global “haves” will only increase their wealth and control in a network
society. For many, the internet is a model of new, and effective,
network governance,78 while the story of the manipulations of
intellectual property holders around the TRIPS agreement is the
archetype of networked governance in the service of the rich.79
Braithwaite, who has written the definitive account of how transnational
corporations exploit governance networks, has argued that there is space
for networked governance to work for the “have-nots” that can team up
and concentrate their power.80

76. Charlotte Streck, Global Public Policy Networks as Coalitions for Change, in GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: OPTIONS & OPPORTUNITIES 121-122 (Daniel C. Esty & Maria H.
Ivanova eds., 2002).
77. Peter M. Haas, Addressing the Global Governance Deficit, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 13
(2004); Lobel, supra note 2; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 4.
78. Post & Johnson, supra note 4; Teubner, supra note 4; see Haas, supra note 77 (discussing
networked governance in the environment).
79. Burris, Drahos & Shearing, supra note 11.
80. Braithwaite states:
I have become persuaded that we live in an era of networked governance. An
implication of this is that developing countries might jump over their regulatory state era
and move straight to the regulatory society era of networked governance. Developing
states might therefore cope with their capacity problem for making responsive regulation
work by escalating less in terms of state intervention and more in terms of escalating
state networking with non-state regulators.
Braithwaite, supra note 14 at 890. .Peter Spiro provides the following example in the case of rain
forest destruction: “Unable to influence policymaking in Brazil, local activists turned to U.S. and
European NGOs, who in turn pressured the multilateral banks (both directly and through their own
governments), who in turn pressured Brazil to attend to deforestation.” Spiro, supra note 4 at 11.
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ii. “Whole of Government”: Networks in a Policy Framework
Whereas Castells and those he has influenced address the flow of
information through networks as their primary focus of analysis, an
important group of scholars typified by Roderick Rhodes have adopted
the network model within an institutional, policy-oriented framework.81
This literature deals concretely with the problem of making and
implementing policy in state-centered networks comprised of both
public and private nodes. Policy network analyses began by analyzing
and categorizing the many forms of networks that could exist in terms of
what kinds of policy domains they address, and the types of institutions
that tend to dominate them.82 Thus, there exist multiple forms of policy
networks in the contemporary landscape of governance: some are largely
coordinated by public authorities, others have more minimal forms of
state involvement, and still others are dark networks organized contrary
to state law, in service of illegal activities.83 Turning their cacophony
into harmonious governance is a major, if not the main, challenge for
government.
Of late, more emphasis in the literature has been placed on
analyzing the internal political dynamics of policy networks, and their
impacts in terms of how they distribute “collective benefits,” such as
security, education, and health services.84 This literature has found
policy networks, as they have so far developed, to generally be exclusive
in their membership. The networks tend to take seriously the “voices”
(and by extension, the forms of knowledge) of their members.
Consequently, they tend to serve the policy interests of those members.
This raises the fear that contemporary policy networks are, for the most
part, characterized by a lack of legal, political, and fiscal accountability.
This characterization contributes to themes of a widening “democratic
deficit” between “have” and “have-not” segments of the community in

81. Rhodes, Network Governance speech, supra note 52; RHODES, UNDERSTANDING
GOVERNANCE, supra note 3; R.A.W. Rhodes, Policy Networks: A British Perspective, 2 J. OF
THEORETICAL POL. 293 (1990). [hereinafter Rhodes, Policy Networks].
82. See Rhodes, Policy Networks, supra note 81. Cf. Slaughter, supra note 3 (discussing
emergence and role of policy networks in international relations).
83. Rhodes, id.
84. Ostrom, supra note 10; Rhodes, Network Governance speech, supra note 52; RHODES,
UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE, supra note 3; Rhodes, Policy Networks, supra note 81; Eva
Sorenson & Jacob Torfing, Network Politics, Political Capital, and Democracy, 26 INT’L J. PUB.
ADMIN. 609 (2003).
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neo-liberal times.85 This is true across a range of social services, ranging
from the environment,86 to health,87 to human security.88
A number of scholars have worked to define appropriate
institutional arrangements within networks to ensure effective forms of
deliberation that lead to rational policy outcomes that serve the common
interest.89 On the one hand, there is empirical evidence to suggest that
there ought to be rules excluding “symbolic” and/or “emotional”
communications from deliberation.90 On the other hand, some theorists
have mobilized evidence indicating that including more emotional
arguments serves an important psychological function: catharsis, it is
argued, gives people a higher emotional stake in their agreements,
increasing the likelihood that policy approaches agreed upon through
deliberation will be sustainable in practice.91 What is of clear
importance is the role of political brokerage and exchange between
network constituents in accounting for the emergent character of policy
forms around us.
iii. Nodal Governance: A Focus on the Institutions in Networked
Governance
The concept of “nodal” governance has emerged from diverse
scholarship that has made networks a central element in governance
theory.92 In contrast to accounts that highlight the structure of the
85. Sorenson & Torfing, supra note 84.
86. Lorraine Elliot, Global Environmental Governance, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 54-74 (Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes eds., Routledge 2002); Ostrom, supra
note 10.
87. Ollila, supra note 34.
88. Michael Kempa & Les Johnston, Challenges and Prospects for the Development of
Inclusive Plural Policing in Britain: Overcoming Political and Conceptual Obstacles, 38 AUSTL.
AND N. Z. J. CRIMINOL. 181 (2005).
89. See Ostrom, supra note 10; see also John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy in Divided
Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia, 33 POL. THEORY 218 (2005); JOHN S. DRYZEK,
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS (Oxford
University Press 2000); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE
SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES,
SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS (2004).
90. HABERMAS, STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 20; HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS
AND NORMS, supra note 20; HABERMAS, VOLUME 2, supra note 20; HABERMAS, VOLUME 1, supra
note 20.
91. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (Verso 2000); Chantal Mouffe,
Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?, 66 SOC. RES. 745 (1999).
92. Braithwaite, supra note 14; Jennifer Wood, Research and Innovation in the Field of
Security: A Nodal Governance View, in DEMOCRACY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY 217
(Jennifer Wood & Benoît Dupont eds., 2006); Drahos, supra note 60; Clifford Shearing & Jennifer
Wood, Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New “Denizens”, 30 J. LAW AND SOC’Y 400
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network—its web of connections—nodal governance focuses on the
nodes—the institutions of governance—in systems of networked power:
their internal constitutions, their cultures, their resources, and the
strategies they use to amass and project power. A “node” is any formal
or informal institution that is able to secure at least a toe-hold in a
governance network. This definition emphasizes the role of networks in
contemporary governance, but also that robust governance capacity
generally requires that the point of network access be a structure that
enables the accumulation, and directed mobilization, of resources into
the network over time.93 In contrast to the work on policy networks,
nodal governance accepts, without reservation, the premise that
governance is not the sole prerogative of government, and indeed that
the claims of right and legitimacy, bundled up with the notion of
“government,” are themselves forms of discursive power.94
Governing nodes take many forms, from government entities, to
foundations and NGOs, to street gangs. From a nodal perspective, many
large organizations can be seen as nodal assemblages rather than unitary
institutions. For example, state governments are made up of many nodal
assemblages (judiciary, legislature, executive), which are themselves
comprised of further nodes down to the level of a local constituent or
enforcement office.95 Messy assemblages, like states, ultimately aim to
integrate their constituent networks. Drahos has written extensively
about the importance of the “super-structural node.” This type of node
does not integrate networks, “but rather is a structure that brings together
actors who represent networks in order to concentrate resources and
technologies for the purpose of achieving a common goal.”96 His work
documents, for example, how intellectual property holders have relied
on super-structural nodes, like the Business Software Alliance, to
nodally coordinate patent enforcement with U.S. and European
governments.97 Civil society organizations typically use a super(2003); Burris, supra note 11; Benoît Dupont, Security in the Age of Networks, 14 POLICING AND
SOC’Y 76 (2004); Jan Froestad Environmental Health Problems in Hout Bay: the Challenge of
Generalising Trust in South Africa, 31 J. S. AFR. STUD. 333 (2005); Michael Kempa et al.,
Microscopic and Macroscopic Responses to Inequalities in the Governance of Security: Respective
Experiments in South Africa and Northern Ireland, 49 TRANSFORMATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON S. AFR. 25 (2002) (discussing a special issue on crime and policing in transition).
93. Dupont, supra note 92; Burris, Drahos & Shearing, supra note 11.
94. See Crawford, supra note 29.
95. This structure is what enables the sort of networked global governance arrangements
among subordinate state nodes described by Anne-Marie Slaughter. See Slaughter, supra note 3.
96. Drahos, supra note 60, at 404; Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 321 (2004). [hereinafter Drahos, Public Goods].
97. Drahos, supra note 60; Drahos, Public Goods, supra note 96.
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structural device—the coalition—to concentrate and project their power
resources into governance. Normatively, a nodal view de-centers the
state. The aim of good governance becomes not just good government,
but the adaptation of widely accepted norms of transparency,
accountability, and human rights for application to non-state and hybrid
forms of governance.
iv. The Post-Westphalian Paradigm: Networks in Global
Governance
In the international relations literature, the idea of post-Westphalian
governance has been influenced heavily by the architecture of networks.
In particular, Anne-Marie Slaughter has emphasized the ways in which
states, and their departments, have become fragmented into largely
autonomous bureaucracies that are directly linked to one another, and to
other important non-state players in international policy networks.98
Thus, for example, the bureaucrats of the Canadian Ministry of
Development are directly linked to their counterparts in Botswana, and
to
representatives
of
international
development
agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, and local community leaders, all with
minimal levels of ministerial involvement or accountability on either
end.
Differences in how states deal with each other are only part of the
post-Westphalian phenomenon. Further, as we have intimated above,
state-backed international governance agencies, such as the U.N., are
under serious pressure to shape their behavior to suit the preferences of
the most powerful nation-states, corporate actors, and sometimes even
high-profile nongovernmental organizations.99
Yet, international
organizations also acquire new power by their capacity to project
information into potent private governance networks. Lawrence Helfer
has documented the long-term success of the International Labor
Organization in using its monitoring powers to name and shame state
actors – even non-ratifying ones -- into compliance with treaties.100 The
case of the WHO and the SARS outbreak in China offers another
excellent example.101 As we have already discussed, the activities of
98. Slaughter, supra note 3; SLAUGHTER, supra note 4; Fidler, supra note 2.
99. Anyaoku, supra note 47; Chimni, supra note 38; FALK, supra note 14; GEORGE
MONBIOT, THE AGE OF CONSENT: A MANIFESTO FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Zurn, supra
note 14.
100. Lawrence Helfer, Monitoring Compliance with Un-ratified Treaties: The ILO Experience,
71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. __ (forthcoming 2008).
101. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Jacques deLisle, Atypical Pneumonia and
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NGOs in the international system have contributed powerfully to the
view that a state-based conception of international relations is
outdated.102
v. The Problems of Access and Membership
Networks make possible a global, information-based society of the
sort Castells envisions, but he himself notes that it also creates a new
“Fourth World”—a marginalized social class comprised of the vast
majority of the Earth’s population. This Fourth World is relegated to
informational black holes, cut off from the information flows that drive
the knowledge economy.103 Niklas Luhmann argued that the worst
calamity of contemporary society is “no longer exploitation and
suppression but neglect.”104 Shearing writes of how gated communities
that exist cheek-by-jowl with slum settlements in Cape Town exemplify
a new world order in which global elites live on islands of privilege in a
world of deprivation.105 The nodal governance writers argue that it is
essential to identify and promote models of governance that ensure that
all have “substantial and equal opportunities to participate directly in
decisions that effect them.”106 This problem of “democratic deficits” has
the potential to undermine the legitimacy of networked governance
theory as a means of advancing democracy, and render the governance

Ambivalent Law and Politics: SARS and the Response to SARS in China, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 193
(2004).
102. See Spiro, supra note 4; Haque, supra note 12; Blagescu & Young, supra note 3.
103. See CASTELLS, supra note 7, at 19.
104. Niklas Luhmann, Globalization or World Society: How to Conceive of Modern Society?,
7 INT’L REV. OF SOC.—REVUE INERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 67, 74 (1997). Luhmann’s work,
mediated through Teubner, has been an important influence on governance literature. Of particular
importance is the concept of autopoiesis, which in this context refers to the tendency of systems
(and components of systems, like governance institutions) to become self-referential—that is, to
reconstruct external reality in conformity with the demands of internal coherence and cohesiveness.
Such institutions or systems cannot be open to the ideas and demands of outsiders, even when they
appear to be. Id.; Andrew Dunshire, Tipping the Balance: Autopoiesis and Governance, 28 ADMIN.
& SOC’Y 299 (1996); AUTOPOIESIS AND CONFIGURATION THEORY: NEW APPROACHES TO
SOCIETAL STEERING (Roeland J. In’ T. Veld et al. eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991). Seeing
only what it wants to see, the institution proceeds on a self-destructive course of action in which
each setback is interpreted as validation. An important point emerging here is that a critical feature
on which to evaluate any system for governance is the capacity to gather, and then process,
information with a minimum of bias arising from the culture or interests of the governing system.
105. Shearing, supra note 24, at 14-15.
106. See Burris, Drahos & Shearing, supra note 11; NICK DEVAS, WHO RUNS CITIES? THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN URBAN GOVERNANCE, SERVICE DELIVERY AND POVERTY (1999);
ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY (Princeton
University Press 2004).
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reform project an idle past-time that will never benefit the mass of the
world’s population.
One reaction is to consider better ways to design and manage
networks to be inclusive.107
Thus the suggestion of
“microgovernance”—the seeding of new governance institutions within
excluded communities.108
More broadly, the impulse towards
community deliberation and participatory structures in a wide range of
activities reflects the recognition that active intervention often may be
needed to open network societies to all stakeholders.109 Some scholars
have tried to address exclusion from governance by breaking down
conventional assumptions about the membership and rights of inclusion
in networks. In contrast to notions of “citizenship” in state collectives,
membership in contractual non-state orders has been thought about in
terms of “denizenship,” under which stake, rather than point of origin,
would define access to at least certain rights and benefits.110 Rather than
classify institutions in terms of their location in the public versus private
sphere, some authors have begun to draw functional distinctions between
auspices, under whose authority governance is undertaken, and
providers, who undertake the actual business of governance.111 As we
introduced above, governance can be initiated by either state or non-state
impetus, and, subsequently conducted by either state or non-state
agencies—in the contemporary interlinked society, all of these forms of
governance will have profound collective impacts. In taking such a
functionalist view of governing agencies, addressing these difficulties
leads to questions about where best to locate, and how best to control,
broader collective resources and oversight functions to ensure the
equitable distribution of collective goods.

107. Castells certainly encourages this. See CASTELLS, supra note 7.
108. Scott Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 335 (2004);
accord Maurits Barendrecht & Patricia Van Nispen, Microjustice (2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/paper=1022936 (describing bottom-up approach to justice services based on small,
local institutions).
109. See, e.g., Leonardo Avritzer, Public Deliberation at the Local Level: Participatory
Budgeting in Brazil (2000); Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered
Deliberation in Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 POL. & SOC. 73 (2001); Louise Trubek, New
Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139 (2006).
110. Shearing & Wood, supra note 92; see also PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP:
AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2007).
111. See David H. Bayley & Clifford D. Shearing, The New Structure of Policing: Description,
Conceptualization, and Research Agenda (National Institute of Justice 2001).
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D. How Do Distributed Governors Govern?
The techniques of governance have received considerable attention
in various literatures, ranging from the social theory of Michel Foucault
to the extensive technical literature on regulation associated with the
Anglo-Australian school of regulatory studies. Despite the diversity in
these literatures, which deal at varying levels of abstraction with
multiple levels of social organization, there is a similarity in the
fundamental recognition of the problem of governance as managing
complex systems in which governing power is distributed effectively
across many more actors than can be managed by centralized command
and control techniques. In this section, we describe several important
literatures on the techniques of governance.
i. Soft Law and “The Regulation of Social Meaning”
“Soft law” methods depend upon the power of social and
institutional norms, information, and transparency to mobilize voluntary
compliance. For states, this has the theoretical benefit of efficiently
reserving the use of hard sanctions, or direct government command and
control, for a few special cases.112 Non-state governors have limited
recourse to hard law,113 so their natural realm is the softer one of
discourse. Social entrepreneurs have become adept at deploying
sophisticated information strategies to influence mass opinion and
government action. Researchers have documented the use of many
time-honored, and a few new, strategies that depend upon creating and
disseminating information: shaming and other strategies that heavily
depend on enrolling the media; product certification schemes, which rely
on market forces to promote desired behavior;114 and new information
and mobilization strategies that exploit decentralized media, like the
112. On the one hand, such programs for governance at a distance can be thought of as
enhancing the capacity of the state to govern a widening sphere of social processes more effectively
and efficiently. On the other hand, however, other trends in the form and exercise of authority
indicate that state governability and accountability are slipping. The diffusion of decision-making
authority throughout the bureaucracies of state governments can obscure responsibility, with the
effect that ministerial accountability for governmental policy increasingly stands as a “strange legal
fiction.” Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, supra note 10, at 156-57.
113. Braithwaite, supra note 14 at 895 (discussing the potential for qui tam statutes to
empower non-state governors).
114. See Spiro, supra note 4; Taylor, supra note 43; Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1639 (2006). Governments also use certification regimes to regulate other governments. See, e.g.,
Julie Ayling, Conscription in the War on Drugs: Recent Reforms to the U.S. Drug Certification
Process, 16 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 376 (2005).
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internet and cell-phones.115 Much of their effectiveness depends upon
the development and effective use of technical expertise concentrated in
institutions operating at strategic nodes of advocacy networks.116
“Soft” law is not just a project of the weak. Braithwaite and Drahos
extensively documented how transnational corporations use information
and networking techniques to govern.117 For example, those who hold
intellectual property patents now hire private agencies to search out
evidence of piracy in software music and video, and then use the
evidence gathered to convince the US trade authorities to threaten
sanctions within the World Trade Organization regime on countries that
are not exerting enough influence to stamp out counterfeiting.118 Timur
Kuran and Cass Sunstein cite the example of how tort reform has been
framed by agents of large corporations that have promoted the
availability of stories of (aberrantly) large punitive damage verdicts.119
The idea of soft law runs through a variety of new governance
literatures.120 It has considerable resonance with the constitutive school
of law and society scholarship, but perhaps owes its greatest debt to
Foucault’s account of truth and systems of knowledge as themselves
being key mechanisms of governance.121 Foucault was very concerned
with identifying the key conditions of possibility that enabled particular
ways of thinking about and so doing the business of governance, the
business of personal and collective health, the business of economy,
etc.122 Foucault set about examining overarching rationalities of
115. See, e.g., William H. Dutton & Wan-Ying Lin, Using the Web in the Democratic Process:
The Web-Orchestrated ‘Stop the Overlay’ Cyber-Campaign, 9 EUROPEAN REVIEW 185 (2001);
Herman Wasserman, Renaissance and Resistance: Using ICTs for Social Change in Africa, 64
AFRICAN STUDIES 177 (2005).
116. John Braithwaite has defined a set of effective strategies for weak states and non-state
governors to use based on the successful governance efforts of the powerful. See Braithwaite,
Methods, supra note 13; see also JENNIFER WOOD & CLIFFORD SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY
(Willan Publishing 2006) (applying Braithwaite’s analysis to define methods of power for the weak
in security); Scott Burris et al., Emerging Strategies for Healthy Urban Governance, 84 J. URB.
HEALTH 154 (2007) (applying Braithwaite’s analysis to define methods of power for the weak in
health).
117. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 59.
118. DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14; Scott, supra note 14.
119. See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 683 (1999) (describing how “availability entrepreneurs” can instigate
“availability cascades” to influence policy).
120. See Lobel, supra note 2, at 391-95 (discussing the idea of soft law).
121. See Colin Gordon, Governmental Rationality: An Introduction, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT
1, 8 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991).
122. See Foucault, Governmentality, supra note 10 (contextualizing different “acts of
government”); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Pantheon
Books 1978); [hereinafter FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY]; MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:
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governance by reading primary texts across of an array of domains, such
as doctors’ manuals, prison wardens’ records and accounts, and policing
institutions’ texts.123 He did so with the intent to uncover commonalities
in ways of thinking about the world and how best to govern it. He
demonstrates it is possible to speak of different forms of “liberalism” in
terms of sets of beliefs, or, “régimes of truth,” about how the world
works and why and how people act the way they do with in it, that are
literally embedded in particular governance practices. For Foucault,
these overarching rationalities eventually become widespread enough to
take on lives of their own, obscuring alternative ways to think about and
do the business of governance.124 Thus, the rationality of liberalism of
various stripes can be mobilized by governing actors with the view to
attaching legitimacy to their actions and de-legitimizing other forms of
thinking and acting.125
ii. Mobilization and Coordination of Diffused Knowledge and
Capacity
An equally influential account has conceptualized governance in
terms of the mobilization and coordination of knowledge and capacity
that is diffused throughout the system. Friedrich Hayek, who premised
his analysis of governance on the complexity of social systems and the
inability of central planners to comprehend or effectively manage them,
has been a seminal thinker in this approach.126 Hayek’s account rested
on the challenge of information flow, which he contended was best
managed through a decentralized, polycentric process exemplified by
markets.127 His work has natural affinities with network accounts such
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Vintage Books 1979) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, PUNISH]; Michel
Foucault, Candidacy Presentation Collège de France, in ETHICS, SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH:
ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT 1954-1984, 5-10 (Paul Rabinow ed., New Press 1997)
[hereinafter Foucault, Candidacy Presentation]; Michel Foucault, Politics and the Study of
Discourse, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 53-72 (Graham Burchell,
Colin Gordon & Peter Miller eds., University of Chicago Press 1991) (1968) [hereinafter Foucault,
Politics and Discourse].
123. See, e.g., Gordon supra note 121, at 3.
124. See id. at 7 (noting Foucault’s thesis of sovereignty as the interdependence between the
“government of men” and the “manifestation of truth”); cf. Scott Burris, The Invisibility of Public
Health: Population-Level Measures in a Politics of Market Individualism, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1607 (1997) (describing how market ideology renders public health invisible in policy).
125. See ROSE, POWERS, supra note 13; Rose, Death of Social, supra note 13; Rose & Miller,
supra note 13.
126. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (W.W. Bartley
III ed., 1988).
127. HAYEK, supra note 126. For an example of Hayek’s influence in contemporary analysis of
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as Castells’,128 which centers on the fact that hierarchical, bureaucratic
modes of organization are inadequate to the task of accommodating the
massive amount of information that moves through networks.
If new governance draws on Hayek for its account of decentralized
decision-making in complex systems, it has little interest in leaving
things to the market. Left unregulated, better resourced nodes in a
market network will be more successful in gaining access to, compiling,
and making use of valuable information than poorer, weaker ones. As
we have noted in the work of the policy network theorists,129 the game of
partisan politics adds the additional layer of competition between ingroups for dominance in directing and reaping the benefits of
governance processes. All things being unequal, networks that are
powerful tend to be dominated by the most powerful segments of
society, who accomplish this largely by taking control of the flow of
information in their favor. The remedy, if remedy there be, is to create
more access to governance networks for the weak, and for weaker
players to learn to use more effectively the methods perfected by the
powerful.130
Here John Dewey provides the inspiration: the dominant
mechanism proposed for mobilizing change is “democratic
experimentalism,”
expressed
largely
through
“institutional
innovation.”131 At the local level, this may take the form of new
institutions that provide public goods that the state seems unable to,132 or
that give voice and collective efficacy to people that have been excluded
in the past.133 Creative invention and reinvention of democratic

governance, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups Versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek's
Challenge
to
Habermas),
EPISTEME
(forthcoming
2008),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/paper=956189.
128. CASTELLS, supra note 7.
129. Rhodes, Network Governance speech, supra note 52; RHODES, UNDERSTANDING
GOVERNANCE, supra note 3; Rhodes, Policy Networks, supra note 81.
130. See Braithwaite, supra note 13; WOOD & SHEARING, supra note 116.
131. See Teubner, supra note 4; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 4; UNGER, supra note 5.
132. For example, the Zwelethemba Project in South Africa is built around a micro-institution
called the Peace Committee, which provides dispute resolution and community development
services in informal settlements underserved by the police and courts. See WOOD & SHEARING,
supra note 116.
133. For example, the Sonagachi Project introduced a new institution—the sex worker
collective—as an HIV prevention intervention in Calcutta in the early 1990s. It deployed a
mentality of worker’s rights and occupational safety among sex workers using simple community
organization techniques like peer education. It has grown to thousands of members, significantly
improved sex workers relations with madams, pimps, and the police, and has been given substantial
credit for the unusually low rates of HIV among Calcutta sex workers compared to other major
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institutions is seen as an essential means of destabilizing systems that
have are dominated by elites.134
At the border between reinventing governance and reinventing
government are participatory institutions, like the advisory bodies
praised by Archon Fung in his work on schools and policing,135 or the
models that Louise Trubek has described in health care.136 The work of
people like Gunther Teubner, Michael Dorf, Charles Sabel, and Joshua
Cohen take the approach to a higher (and more abstract) level.
Accepting polycentricity and diffusion in the governance of complex
systems, they call for institutional forms and practices more adapted to
coordination than command.137 Courts, legislatures, and bureaucracies
may remain in place, but they will be transformed. For example,
legislatures more frequently will define areas and methods for direct
local deliberation, rather than make substantive rules for conduct;
administrative agencies will work to diffuse information, rather than
write regulations; and courts’ primary role will be to “require that
decision-making proceed in a directly-deliberative way.”138
iii. Forum Shifting
The fracturing of governance has brought one method of power—
“forum shifting”—into particularly important use. Through forum
shifting, changing the locus of governing control becomes a strategy.

Indian cities. See Ishika Basu et al., HIV Prevention Among Sex Workers in India, 36 J. ACQUIR.
IMMUNE DEFIC. SYNDR. 845 (2004).
134. Unger, supra note 5.
135. FUNG, supra note 106.
136. Trubek, supra note 3.
137. See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 4 (advocating “societal constitutionalism”); Cohen & Sabel,
supra note 7. Dorf and Sabel put the matter like this:
To reinvigorate our Madisonian heritage . . . we need a new model of institutionalized
democratic deliberation that responds to the conditions of modern life. Such a
reconceptualization must avoid the presumptions and coyness of an immediate
partisanship claiming to speak for a revolution that speaks for itself. It must also resist
the contrary rationalizing impulse that denies the possibility of all innovation by
reducing novelty to a problem of classification in familiar categories or to new rules for
rearranging the familiar furniture of our institutions. The foundation of this architecture
would be a new connection between the broad pronouncements of the legislature and the
courts, and applications of these pronouncements to particular situations. This
connection would have to leave room for experimental elaboration and revision to
accommodate varied and changing circumstances, yet credibly limit the opportunities for
self-dealing that this very openness of necessity seems to create.
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 4, at 283-84. Cf. Black, supra note 19 (analyzing methods of “enrolling”
actors to act as regulators in de-centered governance systems).
138. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 7, at 334-35.
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Forum shifting may be defined as relocating interactions (like
negotiation or regulation) from an institution of governance in which an
actor encounters resistance to one where the actor is likely to achieve its
objective.139 It happens in many ways: moving from one forum to
another; simply withdrawing from participation or recognition of a
governing institution or network; or pursuing the same agenda in many
fora.140 Forum shifting has been an extremely useful tool of the
powerful; it can also work for weaker players like cities and NGOs.
Major intellectual property holders were pursuing a forum-shifting
strategy when they promoted the TRIPS treaty as means of moving
intellectual property disputes from the World Intellectual Property
Organization to the World Trade Organization, a move that would not
only entail new rules and new arbiters but also a new network of
participants: whereas NGOs had some official standing and long-term
relationships at WIPO, they were essentially excluded from the WTO.141
Local governments are forum shifting when, for example, they file
damages law-suits against gun makers in places where provincial and
national legislatures have rejected gun-control regulation.142
iv. Functionalist Accounts: Standards, Oversight, and Enforcement
The regulatory literature identifies three generic tasks a regulatory
system must accomplish: (1) set standards (whether of behavior or
outcome); (2) monitor compliance; and (3) enforce compliance upon
those who do not obey.143 The weakening of the public-private
distinction, and the recognition that governance is or can be distributed
throughout a system, has allowed regulatory scholars to describe and
prescribe regulatory schemes in which the generic elements of regulation
are divided among or shared by many actors.144
139. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 59. Laurence Helfer uses the term “regime
shifting.” Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L LAW 1 (2004).
140. Braithwaite, Methods, supra note 13.
141. Helfer, supra note 139.
142. David Kairys, The Cities Take the Initiative: Public Nuisance Lawsuits Against Handgun
Manufacturers, in GUNS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 363 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., New
York University Press 2003).
143. Black, supra note 19, at 167; Braithwaite, supra note 14; Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy
and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD)
Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE 503 (2002); Robert E. Goodin,
Democratic Accountability: The Distinctiveness of the Third Sector, XLIV ARCH. EUROP. SOCIOL.
359 (2003); Moran, supra note 2; Scott, supra note 14 at 160.
144. The metaphor of “regulatory space” has been a useful heuristic for framing the inquiry of
how to manage nodal social behavior towards good collective ends. See Leigh Hancher & Michael
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Government action is one model for setting standards, but there are
many others. Market competition between providers can perform a
similar function; where consumers vote with their feet in search of better
services.
State regulators traditionally monitored compliance
themselves, but now often contract out this function. Semi-independent
watchdog organizations may do this work, or the state may leave
monitoring to the organization in question itself, or some professional
association comprised of representatives of a broader collective (i.e.
“self-regulation”).145 With respect to enforcement, again, it is possible
for the state to act directly, to engage the services of others to carry out
discipline, or to leave discipline to the agency in question.
In practice, regulation in the neo-liberal order has most often taken
on the character of states acting directly to set standards (sometimes in
consultation with community advisory structures), acting at a distance to
conduct monitoring through semi-independent watchdog organizations,
and engaging discipline only where misbehavior has been extreme.146
This has been the norm under partnership approaches to governance
across a range of spheres of service provision. Under the rubric of
reinventing government, states have sought to maintain a grip on the
tiller steering privatized systems for governance while seeking to
mobilize the private entities and market processes to serve the public
interest.147
The impact of such systems for regulation has often been poor: the
regulation literature has confirmed that the most powerful corporate
actors have been able to hijack weak systems of accountability in service
of their own ends. Some speak of the diffusion of a global system of
regulatory capitalism in which governance is operated in the interests of
a corporatocracy that populates power positions in government and
industry.148 The chance of doing things differently, of opening up the
Moran, Organizing Regulatory Space, in CAPITALISM, CULTURE AND ECONOMIC REGULATION 271
(L. Hancher, and M. Moran ed., 1989); see Colin Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented
Resources and Institutional Design, 2001 PUBLIC LAW 329 (2001).
145. See, e.g., Scott Burris & Jennifer Welsh, Regulatory Paradox in the Protection of Human
Research Subjects: A Review of OHRP Enforcement Letters, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 643 (2006)
(describing how U.S. government devolves primary oversight of researchers to Institutional Review
Boards operated by regulated institutions).
146. See Peter N. Grabosky, Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory
Compliance, 8 GOVERNANCE 527 (1995); Moran, supra note 2; Scott, supra note 14.
147. See WILLIAM D. EGGERS & JOHN O’LEARY, REVOLUTION AT THE ROOTS: MAKING OUR
GOVERNMENT SMALLER, BETTER, AND CLOSER TO HOME (Free Press 1995); OSBORNE &
GAEBLER, supra note 3.
148. Levi-Faur, supra note 52; Steve Tombs & David Whyte, Unmasking the Crimes of the
Powerful, 11 CRITICAL CRIMINOL. 217 (2003); O’Reilly & Ellison, supra note 56.
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business of governance to a wider range of non-state entities has so been
harder in practice than in theory. Nonetheless, there have been some
interesting experiences on the ground, which we discuss in the next part.
E.

Changes in Governance: A Summary

In the cause of simplifying this diverse and useful literature, we can
identify three kinds of governance change:
i. Changes in the Institutions Participating in Governance
Governance is said to be changing both because new institutions are
emerging to exercise power, and because there is an apparent shift of the
locus of control from some governors to others. The emergence of new,
non-state institutions of governance has been documented and discussed
throughout the literatures on governance.149 For example, the Gates
Foundation now exercises enormous authority over the global
governance of health, while the influence of the World Health
Organization has waned.150 The World Bank and the World Trade
Organization, operating under the GATT web of treaties, have taken on
a powerful governing role, not just in international trade, but in matters
like national standards for the environment or worker health and
safety.151 States, however, have less control over certain aspects of
domestic policy by virtue of joining the WTO.152
Globalization is widely seen as increasing the ability of
corporations to flex economic muscles in a fluid global economy.153 To
a lesser but still important extent, NGOs like Greenpeace have become
important players in some areas of global governance, such as the
environment.154 At the national and local levels, shifts in governing
control often reflect efforts to place power in the “right” hands for good
governance. There is a broad theme of “subsidiarity” in many
149. See, e.g., Haas, supra note 77 (environment); Rene Loewenson, Civil Society Influence on
Global Health Policy, Annotated Bibliography on Civil Society and Health, CSI/2003/B14, (Civil
Society Initiative, April, 2003), available at http://www.tarsc.org/WHOCSI/pdf/WHOTARSC4.pdf
(health); Ana Hardoy et al., Governance for Water and Sanitation Services in Low-Income
Settlements: Experiences with Partnership-Based Management in Moreno, Buenos Aires, 17 ENV’T
& URBANIZATION 183, 190 (2005) (urban development).
150. Cohen, supra note 41; Fidler, supra note 2.
151. See KOHLMORGEN, supra note 10.
152. See Chimni, supra note 38.
153. See, e.g., DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14; Teubner, supra note 4.
154. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 4. Framed in terms of agency, changes in the locus of control
can be instigated by forum- or regime-shifting, two of the most important contemporary methods of
power. See Helfer, supra note 139; DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14.
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literatures—the idea that power should be devolved to the (lowest) level
of governance that can effectively formulate and implement policies,155
as well as more specific activities like the development of optimal
arrangements of metropolitan civil government156 and the
implementation of participatory practices in areas like policing,157
schools,158 and budgeting.159
ii. Changes in Methods of Power
A second form of change frequently identified in the literature is in
the means that governors use to project power towards other governors
and individuals in the system.160 Dissatisfaction (justified or not) with
traditional regulatory strategies has prompted interest in alternatives to
traditional command and control regulation—regulation by markets (or
deregulation),161 but also techniques of “smart regulation,”162 audit,163
and a wide range of “rule at a distance” methods in which various forms
of standard-setting and self-regulation are used instead of more
command-and-control based forms.164 A great deal of the literature
155. Streck, supra note 76, at 125; see also Burris, supra note 116 (discussing localism in
global public heath governance).
156. See, e.g., Christian Lefèvre, Metropolitan Government and Governance in Western
Countries: A Critical Review, 22 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 9 (1998); Katherine M. Johnson,
Sovereigns and Subjects: A Geopolitical History of Metropolitan Reform in the USA, 38 ENV’T. &
PLANNING 149 (2006).
157. FUNG, supra note 106; Fung, supra note 109.
158. FUNG, supra note 106; Fung, supra note 109.
159. Rebecca Abers, From Ideas to Practice: The Partido Dos Trabalhadores and
Participatory Governance in Brazil, 23 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 35 (1996); Yves
Cabannes, Participatory Budgeting: A Significant Contribution to Participatory Democracy, 16
ENV’T & URBANIZATION 27 (2004).
160. The utility of money as a method of power requires no discussion, and the use of force,
legitimate or otherwise, is a topic in and of itself. See Shearing, supra note 24 (discussing the
monopoly on the legitimate use of force as a core element of the state-centered governance
paradigm).
161. MARKET-BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, UPSIDE, AND DOWNSIDE
(John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., Brookings 2002).
162. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (Oxford University Press 1992); Scott, supra note 3; NEIL
GUNNINGHAM, PETER GRABOSKY, WITH DARREN SINCLAIR, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998).
163. MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1997).
164. Rose, Death of Social, supra note 13; ROSE, POWERS, supra note 13; Rose & Miller,
supra note 13; RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE, supra note 3. Considerable attention has
been devoted to finding new ways to govern through accountability and transparency mechanisms
that are unlinked from traditional state enforcement institutions and practices. See Mashaw, supra
note 16; Charles F. Sabel, Beyond Principal-Agent Governance: Experimentalist Organizations,
Learning and Accountability, in DE STAAT VAN DE DEMOCRATIE: DEMOCRATIE VOORBIJ DE
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explores a change from hard to soft law regimes that emphasize
“negotiation, trust and the development of common normative
understandings” as means of regulating behavior.165
iii. Changes in the Nature or Effectiveness of Constraints on
Governors
Finally, some writers have observed changes in the nature or
potency of constraints on governors.166 Institutions and methods of
power are distributed across social space, and operate as part of the
adaptive process of people to their social and physical environment.
Such systems are inherently dynamic, though the rate of change in the
system or various constituent domains (like legal institutions) will
vary.167 Constraints in these systems—legal rules, social norms,
information gaps, economic conditions, and so on—interact in complex
ways, so that changes in any one may create new constraints, or alter the
potency of existing constraints.
Writers in the governance literature focus, broadly speaking, on
two kinds of change. The first type encompasses changes produced by
the adaptive work of actors in a system. Much of this falls under the
heading of gaming: any set of constraining rules is subject to the efforts
of the players to subvert them to their own ends. Repeat players,
particularly wealthier repeat players, have a long-term edge in most

STAAT
173
(E.
Engelen
&
M.S.D.
Ho
eds.,
2004),
available
at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Sabel.definitief.doc;
Kenneth
A.
Bamberger,
Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative
State, 56 DUKE L. J. 377 (2006); Robert O. Keohane, Accountability in World Politics, 29
SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 75 (2006); The Social Accountability Sourcebook, (World Bank 2006),
available at http://www-esd.worldbank.org/sac; Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal
Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility?, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom
Campbell eds., 2007); Freeman, supra note 3; Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of
Transparency: What Makes Disclosure Policies Effective? (Ash Institute for Democratic
Governance and Innovation 2004); Black, supra note 19.
165. Mashaw, supra note 16, at 132; Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law
in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); Trubek, supra note 109. See generally
Lobel, supra note 2, at 388-95 (describing the range of “soft law” theories in legal scholarship).
166. See, e.g., András Sajó, Book Review, 3 INT’L I-CON. 697 (2005) (reviewing
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand
& Gunther Teubner eds., 2004)); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton
University Press 2004).
167. For governance analysis explicitly premised on this sort of complex systems view, see
e.g., Post & Johnson, supra note 4; Burris, Drahos & Shearing, supra note 11; Teubner, supra note
4.
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games.168 Various forms of power are marshaled to capture the
umpiring institutions, and to change the formal rules to further
advantage the successful players.169 Methods of oversight can be
reduced, in Michael Power’s telling phrase, to “rituals of verification”
largely devoid of real power to control.170 Both Teubner’s concept of
autopoiesis,171 and the rich American literature on legal consciousness
explore the regulatory implications of the way people in particular
institutions or subcultures recreate law t for their own ends.172 Thus law,
as a method of constraint, is caught in a “regulatory trilemma”: if the law
is strong enough to change the culture of the regulated organization, it
risks crushing the organization’s capacity to maintain robust,
independent norms of virtuous behavior; if the law is too weak, it has no
effect; if the rules are “just right,” chances are we are seeing agency
capture.173
A second flavor of changes in constraint arises from the inadvertent
maladaptation of governance institutions and methods to a changing
environment.174 This line of analysis tends to emphasize the increased
complexity of modern systems and the obsolescence of state-centered
forms of rule in organizing such systems. Dorf and Sabel, for example,
argue that the New Deal Administrative state is no longer up to the task
of legitimate or effective governance: “[O]ur national affairs are too
complex, diverse, and volatile to be governed by lapidary expressions of
the public will—laws of Congress, administrative rules, judicial
judgments—that indicate precisely how to dispose of most of the cases

168. For the classic explication of this in the legal literature, see Marc Galanter, Why the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95
(1974).
169. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A
BILL BECOMES A LAW (1977).
170. POWER, supra note 163. Gaming is not just a regulatory problem, of course, but is also a
feature of politics in governing institutions themselves.
171. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler
trans., Zenon Bankowski ed., 1993).
172. See, e.g., Austin Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal
Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990); DAVID M. ENGEL &
FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE
OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
173. The long-term consequences of this sort of competitive adaptation are grim, in some
writers’ eyes. Teubner argues that state-centered notions of constitutional government lead, in a
modern society, to “a situation of intensive competition for positions of power and social influence,
highly formalized social control, and political and social authoritarianism.” Teubner, supra note 4,
at 10.
174. See, e.g., Shearing, supra note 24.
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to which they will eventually be applied.”175 Braithwaite notes how,
“[b]y the 1990s for the first time, the majority of the largest ‘economies’
in the world were transnational corporations rather than states.”176
Globalization allows transnational corporations to avoid regulations
originating at the individual state level, and to exercise often
considerable governing power with few of the constraints placed on state
governments in state-centered constitutional traditions.177
F. The State of Governance Today
The descriptive analysis of contemporary governance that we
presented above certainly is not flattering. The fragmentation of state
sovereignty, and multiplication of agencies and forms of power active in
contemporary governance, allow wealthier groups to seize the levers of
governance available in diffuse systems of collective governance. In
general, wealthier actors can use their resources to more quickly
comprehend events and project power than their poorer competitors.
The superior ability of the wealthy to operate in a world of
distributed governance has contributed to the creation of a global “super
first world”—a world comprised of fortified enclaves of privilege
largely unfettered by the responsibilities associated with membership in
a widely inclusive society. The excluded are relegated to an everwidening fourth world178 of exclusion from global networks of trade,
culture, and development. This adds up to an emergent system of global
economic apartheid, wherein approximately one billion people mould
the social, political, economic, and biological realms to their purposes,
on the backs of more than five billion marginalized individuals who are
excluded from this vision of the good life.179 Global governance thus
becomes a conflict over values and visions for the future of the planet,
leading to arguments about “the clash of civilizations,”180 and attendant
concerns over escalating sociopolitical conflict between the West and
the rest of the planet. A governance system tending to conflict at a time
when cooperation is sorely needed portends drastic and catastrophic

175. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 4, at 270.
176. John Braithwaite, The New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology, 40
BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 222, 229 (2000).
177. See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 35.
178. CASTELLS, supra note 7.
179. See ALEXANDER, supra note 21; see also Drahos, supra note 60; Ollila, supra note 34
(discussing the implications of this system for the distribution of health and human wellbeing).
180. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1993).
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outcomes in terms of long-term planetary security, global health, and
environmental integrity.181
Thus, governance is not just in a state of change, but is seen by
many as being in poor health. While diagnoses are various, there are
two fundamental critiques of state-centered governance that seem to
appear throughout the governance literature: that “old” institutions of
traditional state governance are no longer working very well, and that a
principal reason for this is, as it were, epistemological: social systems
have become too complex, diverse and particular for centralized, topdown governance to manage, which drives the interest in partnerships,
markets, and local participatory democracy.182 It is perhaps axiomatic
that a scholar who turns to governance as a framework of analysis is
dissatisfied with government. Reinventing government literature sees in
old-fashioned command-and-control regulatory agencies any number of
failures of imagination, efficiency, and responsiveness. The more the
scholar moves towards a broader reinventing governance approach, the
more likely she is to see the failings of old institutions as an inevitable
consequence of social complexity. The governance literature has a
definite Hayekian element in the widely accepted view that hierarchical
systems of centralized government simply cannot understand the
systems they inhabit well enough to properly regulate them.183 Part of
this claim is that the world is just empirically more complex; there is a
lot more movement of people, capital, and information, which means
there is a lot more information to deal with. But it is argued that the
difficulty comes also from the fact that there are now so many more
competing visions for what the proper outcomes of governance ought to
be, and therefore more different ways of conceiving of the proper
business of governance than the state, or any centralized authority, can
internalize or harmonize. This is more than just a Hayekian argument
about central authorities not being able to gather enough information to
govern effectively; they also lack the breadth of perspective that will
enable them to conceptualize problems to begin with in ways that are
more likely to meet contemporary challenges. So it is not that the state
is simply an idiot, but that the state currently reflects the assumptions
about governance that were developed within the contours of a particular
political economy that assumes the utility of its current way of operating.
Given that that broader political economy is now the (inadvertent)
181. FALK, supra note 14; MONBIOT, supra note 99; Luhmann, supra note 104.
182. See OSBORNE AND GAEBLER, supra note 3, at 11-12.
183. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 3 (claiming that Hayek’s influence in governance
accounts is as diverse as Clifford Shearing’s and Margaret Thatcher’s).
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source of many of our most pressing governance challenges—such as
environmental collapse and the attendant spread of contagions, forced
migration, and other security issues—we need to leave space in
governance programs for the inclusion of different framing mentalities,
not just empirical information. Sabel writes:
[I]f, as I and many other [sic] assume, there are no principals in civil
society—not even the political parties that connect it to the agents in
public administration—with the robust and panoramic knowledge
needed for this directive role[;] [t]hen the problem for reform is at least
as much determining ways actors can discover together what they need
to do, and how to do it, as determining which actors ought to be the
principals in public decision making. At the limit, if there are no actors
capable of setting goals with the precision needed to guide effective
public action, governance reform must attend simultaneously to
institutionalizing public or social learning and allocating decisionmaking rights—rather than assuming, as often is the case now, that
learning is automatic when the ‘right’ constellation of principals is in
control.184

Many observers, reflecting a diversity of perspectives within the
social sciences, have converged on the point that systems of governance
are, after all, inhabited by people. This is a part of a conceptual turn in
the social sciences to pay more attention to the human elements—
cultural, cognitive and psychological factors—that inevitably influence
the outcomes of governance processes.185 Sunstein and colleagues, for
example, have examined how the human element complicates the neat
picture of democratic deliberation.186 Likewise, some scholars now
argue that there are certain cultural conditions of possibility that are
essential to the proper functioning of any model of governance.
Considerable work has been done to understand the implications of
empirical comparative studies of trajectories towards democratic rule.
This work centers upon trying to identify core factors relating to the
interactions between political economy, institutional structure, and
human agency that variously contribute to, and inhibit the consolidation
of, effective systems for democratic rule.187 This work connects
184. Sabel, supra note 164, at 3-4.
185. See Janine R. Wedel et al., Toward an Anthropology of Public Policy, 600 ANNALS OF
THE AMER. ACADEMY OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 30 (2005).
186. See, e.g., David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, What Happened on
Deliberation Day? 95 CAL. L. REV. 915 (2007); Sunstein, supra note 127.
187. See, e.g., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Different Methods—Contradictory Results? Research
on Development and Democracy, 32 INT’L J. COMPARATIVE SOC. 1-2 (1991); Wedel et al., supra
note 185.
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governance scholars with researchers interested in the nature and
operation of phenomena such as social capital and collective efficacy.188
Two particularly important aspects of the human element, in terms
of understanding how and why individuals engage systems for
governance in this spirit of collaborative enterprise, are absolutely key:
dynamics concerning “trust” and “hope.” It has been pointed out that
lack of trust between groups in society themselves (i.e., “horizontal”
relationships of trust), and, between social groups and governments (i.e.,
“vertical” relationships of trust) degrades the form of their engagement
in processes of governance.189 Where social groups do not trust one
another, they will either refuse to engage participatory mechanisms for
governance, or, will engage with a view to maximizing their own
personal or their own groups’ benefit, for fear of lack of reciprocation on
the part of competing groups. Where human actors have little or no
hope that their personal and collective situation will improve, it has been
suggested that they will disengage from dominant governance structures
and pursue their ends through alternate means.190
IV. INNOVATION IN GOVERNANCE
The widespread sense that governance is in need of change is
reflected in the volume of innovation at the all levels in the last two
decades. Broadly, these innovations can be separated into two “genres”
of reform: those that focus on the “reinvention of government” and those
that focus on the “reinvention of governance.”
Reinventing government involves efforts to recalibrate state
188. See ROBERT D PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000); Robert Sampson, How Neighborhoods Matter: The Value of Investing at the
Local Level, Congressional Seminar (American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C. 2000);
Robert Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff & Thomas Gannon-Rowley, Assessing ‘Neighborhood
Effects’: Social Processes and New Directions in Research, 28 ANNUAL REV. SOC. 443 (2002);
Robert Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff & Felton Earls, Beyond Social Capital: Spatial Dynamics of
Collective Efficacy for Children, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 633 (1999); Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W.
Raudenbush & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective
Efficacy, 277 SCI. 918-24 (1997). For a careful critical analysis of the uses of social capital and
collective efficacy in policy and governance, see W.G. Carson, Is Communalism Dead? Reflections
on the Present and Future Practice of Crime Prevention: Part One, 37 AUSTRALIAN & NEW
ZEALAND J CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2004); W.G. Carson, Is Communalism Dead? Reflections on the
Present and Future Practice of Crime Prevention: Part Two, 37 AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND J.
CRIMINOLOGY 192 (2004).
189. TRUST AND GOVERNANCE (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998); TRUST:
MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (Diego Gambetta ed., Blackwell Publishing
1990), available at: http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/papers/trustbook.html.
190. See Hope, Power and Governance, in ANNALS OF THE AMER. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOCIAL
SCI. 592 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2004).
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structures to improve their capacity to exercise centralized control of
diffuse systems, often somewhat paradoxically by ceding much of the
implementation of policy to non-state actors through devices like
governance partnerships and self-regulation.
Many reinventing
government schemes have been linked to a neo-liberal, smaller
government ideology, but this category also addresses the capacity of
governments to meet the minimal standards of good governance.191 In
the neo-liberal version of the reinventing government approach, states
and state-backed international institutions devolve the “rowing” of
governance (i.e., service provision) to non-state agencies, while retaining
a firm grip on the business of “steering” governance processes (i.e.,
specifying the goals). The characteristic institutional expression of this
approach is the partnership between state and non-state actors to deliver
services previously delivered by the state. Sometimes the broader public
may be included in the partnership in an advisory capacity, or in publicprivate oversight bodies that share, or even take from the state, the
primary authority to oversee the workings of the partnership. Various
incarnations of this approach have been widely deployed in a number of
countries. The institutional form and mechanisms, along with the
merits, drawbacks, and prospects for varying approaches to reinventing
government, have been the subject of an enormously wide, and
disciplinarily diverse, academic investigation and debate.
Reinventing governance differs in that it takes innovation beyond
the state and public-private partnerships into efforts to identify, cultivate,
and mobilize governors that may act with little or no connection to the
state. Innovators in this realm tend to start with the view that the state
will not be able to overcome the forms of corporate-directed power, and
other factors, that prevent governance from working in the broader
collective interest.192 They seek to develop institutions and practices of
governance that do not depend entirely upon the state, and that mobilize
knowledge, capacity, and resources that have not been directed into
governance before. In some cases, they are explicitly directed at
democratic deficits by seeking to make distributed governance systems
work for the poor. The central idea emerging from these experiments in
governance is the importance of mobilizing knowledge and capacity that
has previously been excluded from, or limited in participation in,
governance. Innovation has been aimed particularly at developing new
institutions, and new tools of governance, that can be placed at the

191. See CHEEMA, supra note 12.
192. See generally FALK, supra note 14.
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disposal of citizens and other stakeholders. Starting with a general
appreciation of the potential for citizen/stakeholder deliberation,
innovators seek to facilitate the emergence of effective governance,
working sometimes in cooperation, and sometimes in competition, with
the state.
A. Remodeling State Direction: Reinventing Government
Reinventing government, as a set of institutions, programs, and
practical strategies, has been undertaken and studied under many
conceptual banners, including “networked governance,”193 “new public
management,”194 and the “new regulatory state.”195 Much of the
innovation in state-centered governance ostensibly has been concerned
with achieving two goals: overcoming the government’s limited reach,
and mobilizing or constraining non-state governors in the public interest.
These efforts have been driven by a sense that the legitimacy and the
capabilities of the state have deteriorated, but also that state-based
governance retains a special claim to legitimacy.196
While neo-liberalism has not been the only discourse for political
reform—and, as scholars who contribute to policy debates are at pains to
point out, is not the only possible discourse upon which to build
programs for devolved governance—it certainly has been the most
influential in Britain, the United States, Canada, and Australia.197 Neoliberalism began largely as a critique of the perceived failures and
excesses of welfarist “big government,” which, it was posited, had
created a dependent and non-entrepreneurial system incapable of
managing the rigors of the new global economy. Its program for
“rightsizing” government, and promoting efficiency and effectiveness
through harnessing the power of the market within government and

193. Bevir & Rhodes, Searching, supra note 9, at 49-54; BEVIR & RHODES, INTERPRETING,
supra note 9; RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE, supra note 3; Rhodes, Policy Networks,
supra note 81.
194. THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM INNOVATING GOVERNORS AND
MAYORS (Paul J. Andrisani, Simon Hakim & Emanuel S. Savas eds., 2002); NEW PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT IN EUROPE: ADAPTATION AND ALTERNATIVES (Christopher Pollitt, Sandra van
Thiel & Vincent Homburg eds., 2007).
195. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 59; Moran, supra note 2; Levi-Faur, supra note 52;
Black, supra note 19.
196. Barry Hindess, Democracy and Disenchantment, 32 AUSTR. J. OF POL. SCI. 79 (1997);
Malcolm Shaw, Overview: Parliamentary Democracy Today, 57 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 702
(2004); see EGGERS & O’LEARY, supra note 147; OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 3.
197. See ROSE, POWERS, supra note 13; Rose, Death of Social, supra note 13; Rose & Miller,
supra note 13.
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across society has made huge inroads into reforming all manner of social
services, ranging from health to housing to human security. This
rationality of government has also informed global development policies
advanced by the biggest players in international development: the
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the World Trade
Organization.198
Part of the project addresses inefficiency, and tends to pursue the
idea that government services ought to be run in a more business-like
fashion, treating citizens as “clients” or “customers.” This can, of
course, be instantiated in more or less symbolic measures, such as a
customers’ bill of rights, but has also taken the form of substantial
reforms. For example, the work of Hernando de Soto has led to
widespread efforts in developing countries to reform land titling and
business regulation schemes as a means of supporting entrepreneurship
among the poor.199 Particularly in international development theory and
practice, efforts to fight corruption and promote accountability have
proceeded under the rubric of “good government.”200 At the heart of the
reform practice, however, has been the rowboat metaphor of devolving
the “rowing” of governance—service provision—to non-state agencies,
while seeking to retain a firm grip on the business of “steering”
governmental processes towards ends defined by traditional democratic
and administrative processes.201 Within the contours of this politicaleconomic rationality, government makes the key collective decisions
about the ends and standards of governance, but gives considerable
discretion (and funding) to other actors to achieve these goals. This leads
to a heavy emphasis on contracting out services202 and deregulation.203
198. See Abrahamsen, supra note 13.
199. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); Ayako Kagawa & Jan Turkstra, The Process of
Urban Land Tenure Formalization in Peru, in LAND, RIGHTS AND INNOVATION: IMPROVING
TENURE SECURITY FOR THE URBAN POOR 57 (Geoffrey Payne ed., 2002); Simon Johnson, Daniel
Kaufmann & Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, Government in Transition: Regulatory Discretion and the
Unofficial Economy, 88 THE AM. ECON. REV. 387 (1998); NORMAN LOAYZA, THE ECONOMICS OF
THE INFORMAL SECTOR: A SIMPLE MODEL AND SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM LATIN AMERICA
(1996); Tor Jansson & Geoffrey Chalmers, The Case for Business Registration Reform in Latin
America (Inter-American Development Bank 2001).
200. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 10; M. A. Thomas, The Governance Bank, 83 INT’L
AFFAIRS 729 (2007).
201. EGGERS & O’LEARY, supra note 147; OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 3.
202. EGGERS & O’LEARY, supra note 147; OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 3. Examples of
outsourcing and privatizing services are found everywhere—from the British rail system to
municipal water supplies in cities throughout the world. See, e.g., George R.G. Clarke, Claude
Menard & Ana Maria Zuluaga, Measuring the Welfare Effects of Reform: Urban Water Supply in
Guinea, 30 WORLD DEV. 1517 (2002); Antonio Estache, Andres Gomez-Lobo & Danny Leipziger,
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Government oversight of the rowers heavily depends on audit
mechanisms, if it is not left to the market and the ability of dissatisfied
clients to vote with their feet.
In service of this approach, neo-liberal government has applied, and
global development agencies have promoted, market principles of
management and the principle of “subsidiarity”—that decision-making
ought to fall to the lowest possible level within an organization—to both
the management of non-state agencies that engage in service provision,
and to government itself.204 Thus, the defining institutional innovation
underpinning neo-liberal approaches to the reinvention of government
has been the partnership between state and non-state actors. Publicprivate partnerships have become increasingly common at the
international level, where they are proposed as effective mechanisms to
mobilize and spend resources in the public interest without the legal and
political drawbacks of bilateral or multilateral government structures, or
the inefficiencies of U.N. organizations. A well-known example is the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, but there are
hundreds of others.205 At the local level, policing, education, waste
management, water, and sanitation services are among the concerns
most commonly, and effectively, addressed by partnerships.206
Given that neo-liberal government is interested in maintaining a
hand on the tiller that steers governance, partnership approaches have
been associated with promoting innovative and varied technologies for
centralized regulation, which are often exercised in conjunction with one
another within broader “tripartite” institutional arrangements. Tripartite
structures combine quasi-independent oversight bodies (which have,
over their histories, become increasingly open to citizen engagement)
with representatives of the executive branch of government and uppermanagement-level members of a particular service-providing agency to
carry out a range of governance activities.207 For example, in Britain,
Utilities Privatization and the Poor: Lessons and Evidence from Latin America, 29 WORLD DEV.
1179 (2001).
203. See ROSE, POWERS, supra note 13; Rose, Death of Social, supra note 13; Rose & Miller,
supra note 13.
204. See Burchell, supra note 13 (providing an analytic account of neo-liberalism at the
national level); Abrahamsen, supra note 13 (providing an analytic account of neo-liberalism at the
supranational level of development studies).
205. See Cohen, supra note 41.
206. Luz Stella Velásquez, Agenda 21; A Form of Joint Environmental Management in
Manizales, Colombia, 10 ENVT. AND URBANIZATION 9 (1998); Luz Stella Velásquez, Agenda 21; A
Form of Joint Environmental Management in Ilo: A City in Transformation, 11 ENV’T AND
URBANIZATION 181 (1998); FUNG, supra note 106.
207. See Blanca P. Ananiadis, Globalization, Welfare and “Social” Partnership, 3 GLOBAL
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responsibility for setting and monitoring policing policy and expenditure
for policing is divided between Chief Constables, the Home Office, and
Police Authorities that comprise local councilors, and some lay members
of the public. Police Authorities have a legal mandate to carry out a
supervisory and auditing function, as well as to inject public preferences
into mid-term policing priorities.
The partnership theme is important, even when it does not take a
fully distinct institutional form. For example, participatory budgeting
has grown over the last twenty years from a Brazilian experiment to an
international model. More than 200 cities in Brazil have adopted a form
of the practice, in which citizens convene to advise the local government
on (and in some models actually determine) the expenditure of public
funds. Countries such as Peru, the Philippines, and the State of Kerala in
India, have adopted legal provisions mandating that citizens directly
voice their priorities in the local government annual budgeting
process.208
Another common example is community policing. It comes in
many versions and definitions, ranging from a largely rhetorical
commitment from the police to “listen” to the community or
acknowledge themselves as members of the community, to deployment
of police officers to visibly patrol and interact in a neighborhood, to
what would begin to look like governance change—the formation of
boards, committees, or other institutional manifestations of partnership
with some level of influence, if not control, being ceded to the
community representatives.209 More powerful, but rarer, is deliberation
with some sort of participatory budgeting component in which the
community has a means of contracting for additional policing services
and coverage.210 Generally, the police remain answerable to traditional
authorities, but the contracting community establishes their agenda and
priorities.211
In many cases, non-state service providers are left largely to
SOCIAL POLICY 213 (2003); Cameron, supra note 12.
208. See The World Bank, The Social Accountability Sourcebook, available at http://wwwesd.worldbank.org/sac/essd9.swf; The World Bank, Social Accountability: an Introduction to the
Concept and Emerging Practice. (Social Development Paper No. 76, 2004).
209. Fung, supra note 109; HESTA GROENEWALD & GORDON PEAKE, POLICE REFORM
THROUGH COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING: PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION
(International Peace Academy 2004), available at www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php?id=34.
210. Adam Crawford, Policing and Security as ‘Club Goods’: The New Enclosures?, 10
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 449 (2006); INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN
IRELAND, A NEW BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1999), available at
http://www.NIO.GOV.UK/a_new_beginning_in_policing_in_northern_ireland.pdf.
211. Crawford, supra note 210.
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regulate themselves through programs of self-regulation. The concept of
self-regulation gets considerable, and often highly technical, coverage in
the literature, and can be advanced by a variety of techniques.212
Compliance with state standards can be checked by audit, and enforced
by markets. Self-regulation may be underpinned by state-directed
constitutive programs for regulation that seek to reconstruct the nonstate actor in such a way that its goals or methods are in alignment with
the goals of the state.213 So pollution trading schemes in the
environmental realm align the corporate profit motive with the state’s
goal of reducing hazardous emissions from the industry as a whole. Of
course, compliance with state standards can also be enforced through the
traditional legal devices of threat of criminal or civil action against
derelict providers along with definitions of good corporate and
individual citizenship in law that call attention to the social significance
of responsible civic engagement.214 Also crucial is the mechanism of
governmental control over public budgets for collective services, which
can be withheld on grounds of inappropriate civil engagement.
The successes and shortcomings of these approaches to the
extension of state regulatory authority across networks for governance
have been mixed. State supervised audit and oversight functions have
been subverted through the gaming efforts of corporations, which learn
quickly how to turn the rules of the regulatory scheme to their own
advantage.215 On the other hand, quasi-independent oversight bodies
have been subject to capture by the very industries they seek to
regulate.216 Private governors are often capable of taking advantage of

212. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 162 (discussing “enforced self-regulation”).
213. Abrahamsen, supra note 13; ROSE, POWERS, supra note 13; Rose, Death of Social, supra
note 13; Rose & Miller, supra note 13.
214. Michiel S. de Vries, The Changing Functions of Laws and its Implication for Government
and Governance, 68 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 599 (2002); ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES (David
Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001).
215. ALEXANDER, supra note 21; DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14; BRAITHWAITE &
DRAHOS, supra note 59; MONBIOT, supra note 99. See generally Lobel, supra note 2 (discussing
how regulated parties typically learn to get around the rules).
216. See Ananiadis, supra note 207; Cameron, supra note 12; Hindess, supra note 196
(discussing regulation in general); TREVOR JONES & TIM NEWBURN, POLICING AFTER THE ACT:
POLICE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE POLICE AND MAGISTRATES’ COURTS ACT 1994 (1997); Kempa &
Johnston, supra note 88 (discussing regulation in the sphere of policing); FRANCISCO R. SAGASTI,
KEITH BEZANSON & FERNANDO PRADA, THE FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCING: CHALLENGES
AND STRATEGIC CHOICES (2005) (discussing regulation in the sphere of development); Ollila, supra
note 34 (discussing regulation in the sphere of health governance); Ostrom, supra note 10; ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1990); Matthew Paterson, David Humphreys & Lloyd Pettiford, Conceptualizing Global
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holes in state authority, and, in other cases, can simply overpower
existing state authority to subvert the collective benefit of partnership
approaches to governance.
The achievement of representativeness in these public-private
bodies has been incomplete. Sometimes community representation is
purely nominal. Even when intended to be real, it can be difficult to
achieve. Concern about bias, weakness and corruption on the part of
regulatory agencies has undermined their public credibility, rendering
difficult-to-reach groups, such as economically marginalized, urbandwelling ethnic minorities, unwilling to engage with regulatory agencies
in processes of partnership governance.217
Too often, as well,
marginalized groups simply are unaware of the role, or even existence
of, these bodies.218 This has raised concerns over the limited
representativeness of participatory structures for regulation, echoing
concerns over exclusivity in networks for service provision outlined in
the previous sections.219 Thus, in addition to corporate gaming, many
efforts to innovate, in the form of fostering partnership approaches
through implementing oversight and accountability measures to
governance, have fallen flat on the vicissitudes of the human dimensions
of partisan politics and social relationships.220
Environmental Governance: From Interstate Régimes to Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 3 GLOBAL
ENVIRON. POL. 1 (2003) (discussing regulation in environmental governance).
217. See e.g., Kempa & Johnston, supra note 88; JONES & NEWBURN, supra note 216
(discussing partnership governance in the domain of policing); Ananiadis, supra note 207;
Cameron, supra note 12; Hindess, supra note 196 (discussing partnership governance in general).
218. See e.g., Kempa & Johnston, supra note 88; JONES & NEWBURN, supra note 216
(discussing partnership governance in the domain of policing); Ananiadis, supra note 207;
Cameron, supra note 12; Hindess, supra note 196 (discussing partnership governance in general).
219. CENTRE FOR THE FUTURE STATE, SIGNPOSTS TO MORE EFFECTIVE STATES: RESPONDING
TO GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Institute of Development Studies,
2005), available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/futurestate/pdfs/SignpoststoMoreEffectiveStates.pdf
[hereinafter CENTRE FOR THE FUTURE STATE]; Bevir & Rhodes, Searching, supra note 9; BEVIR &
RHODES, INTERPRETING, supra note 9 at 75-76; RHODES, UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE, supra
note 3; Rhodes, Policy Networks, supra note 81; Sorenson & Torfing, supra note 84.
220. These themes are illustrated through a brief description of participatory governance
structures in São Paulo, Brazil prepared by The Centre for the Future State. CENTRE FOR THE
FUTURE STATE, supra note 219, at 21, 24-25. Over the course of the nation’s transition to
democracy, civil organizations were active in negotiating the design of Brazil’s impressive
democratic constitution of 1988. Id. The Constitution created extensive institutional mechanisms
for direct citizen participation in the design of public policy and the regulation of government
action. Id. As a result, participatory institutions for setting policy and defining budgets, in such
domains as public health, security, and other collective services, were created at the federal, state,
and municipal level in Brazil. Id. The most successful participatory structures were those that were
given the widest mandate to coordinate networks of local associations, advocacy NGOs, and other
actors, rather than those tasked with holding a particular public institution to account. Further, those
structures that have been most successful in instigating participation from hard-to-hear groups are
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Perhaps the most sensitive issue is whether government partners
actually cede real power. In participatory budgeting, for example,
officials are not always legally required to accept the decisions
voluntarily made at these community-led meetings, and may partly or
completely ignore them; some programs do not devolve any true power
at all to the community.221 Advisory partnerships, common in areas like
community policing, exhibit the weakest (though not necessarily
illusory) level of governance control—what might be called discursive
or deliberative control.222 The governing potency of the community
police institutions or meetings largely depends on the willingness of the
police to be governed, or on the extent to which the community
involvement function is backed by the direct authority of city or police
managers.223 These kinds of limitations have, in part, driven the interest
in more radical forms of reinvention, to which we turn now.
B. Diffusing Authority: Reinventing Governance
We should not be surprised to find that governance reform initiated
by the state and state-backed international institutions will continue to
emphasize the state’s role and control: that is consistent with 300 years
of immersion in Enlightenment analytic devices (e.g., scientific
observation) and standards for public governance and citizen
engagement (i.e., rational, centralized management).224 For innovators
in governance, such a traditional worldview is a barrier to effective
those that have interests that stretch across the geographical space of the city, rather than interests
limited to a particular locality.
Nevertheless, nearly 20 years into their operation, there has been some “slippage” in the form of
participatory mechanisms being dominated by community leaders, neighborhood associations, and
NGOs, rather than independent citizens. Given that most such collectivities are not membershipbased, this raises serious questions as to whom they speak for when they participate in policy
dialogue. See Abrahamsen, supra note 13; Ruggie, supra note 14.
221. CLAUDIO ACIOLY, JR. ET AL., PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
SANTO ANDRÉ, BRAZIL (Institute of Housing and Urban Development Studies 2003); available at
http://www.ihs.nl/start.htm (follow “Downloads” hyperlink; then follow “Staff Publications”
hyperlink; choose “Claudio Acioly”; follow “Acioly 2004_Participatory Budgeting Sto Andre”
hyperlink); Cabannes, supra note 159; Yves Sintomer & Jacques de Maillard, The Limits to Local
Participation and Deliberation in the French “Politique De La Ville”, 46 EUR. J. POL. RES. 503
(2007).
222. Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 JAIP 216 (1969).
223. Fung, supra note 109.
224. See Samantha Ashenden & David Owen, Introduction, in FOUCAULT CONTRA
HABERMAS: RECASTING THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN GENEALOGY AND CRITICAL THEORY 1-20
(Samantha Ashenden & David Owen eds., 1999); BENHABIB, supra note 20; Foucault,
Governmentality, supra note 10; see Hindess, supra note 13 (analyzing various formulations of state
power); Ostrom, supra note 10, at 495-97.
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reform. Reinventing governance, like reinventing government, is an
approach with many and diverse practitioners and theorists, but they
tend to have in common a full acceptance of the picture of polycentric,
distributed governance set out above. They believe that state-centered
authority and rational central management cannot overcome the
complexities that hobble government today. Therefore, they tend to start
from scratch, looking beyond traditional Western models of governance
and asking, “Where and how else has governmental authority been
located and exercised in the broader collective interest?”
Those we place in the reinventing governance camp have been
trying to solve two primary problems in state-centered governance: (1)
democratic deficits, and (2) limited capacity to centrally manage
normative and factual complexity.
Hence, whereas reinventing
government is exemplified by the public-private partnership, reinventing
governance promotes new non-state institutions in which local
knowledge and capacity can be mobilized for independent decisionmaking and management.225 There is considerable interest in developing
institutions and methods of power that can allow the relatively weak to
compete with transnational corporations and elites that control state
governments. In this we see both the strong normative orientation
towards democracy and distributive justice, and the recognition that the
powerful have done very well in adapting to polycentric, decentralized
governance.
New governance thinking, like the reinventing government
approach, tends to emphasize the importance of institutions that foster
collective deliberation to shape public policy and oversee service
delivery at various levels of social organization. But where the neoliberal partnership model involves the state as senior partner, efforts to
reinvent governance often aim to develop systems that feature little or no
control or input from the state. The challenge has been to identify means
of decision-making that balance efficacy and normative acceptability.226
How can radical participatory mechanisms best be structured to ensure
that they work in the common interest, and do not lead to either a
tyranny of the majority or a dominant minority?
225. The literature can be a bit opaque on the role of government in governance. But few, if
any, proponents of radical governance innovations ultimately advocate, or even predict, the
withering away of the state. Government has a role in constituting, funding, or checking new nonstate institutions, and in some accounts, in helping to coordinate or harmonize the outcomes and
knowledge of diffused governors. See, e.g., Cohen & Sabel, supra note 7; Scott Burris, From
Security to Health, in DEMOCRACY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY 196 (Jennifer Wood and
Benoît Dupont eds., Cambridge University Press 2005).
226. See Ostrom, supra note 10; OSTROM, supra note 216.
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Cohen and Sabel capture many of the ideas in play in their concept
of “directly deliberative polyarchy.”227 In this model, “collective
decisions are made through public deliberation in arenas open to citizens
who use public services, or who are otherwise regulated by public
decisions.”228 These deliberative bodies are, to some degree, constituted
by the state, which retains ultimate responsibility for policy-making, but
the state and its traditional institutions—courts, executives, and
legislatures—change their roles; rather than deciding and implementing,
they primarily work to constitute, facilitate, and coordinate directly
deliberative institutions.229 The process allows local policy
experimentation within a circuit of social learning, satisfying both the
imperatives of democracy and the conditions of good governance in
complex systems.230
Much of the discussion remains abstract and theoretical, and to
some extent reflects the long-running debate in the social sciences
between two major “schools” of deliberative democratic thought. In the
domain of Continental theory that draws upon the work of Jürgen
Habermas, the “ideal communication situation” is taken to be founded
on the exclusion of open emotional contestation within deliberative
forums,231 coupled with a degree of “removal” from the political
process, especially within the domain of hotly contested governance

227. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 7. For other accounts of why decentralized participatory
processes are important, and how they may work, see, e.g., Teubner, supra note 4 (describing
“societal constitutionalism”). Lobel describes the useful paradox that guides Teubner’s view of
why decentralized and reflexive legal practices can actually produce greater coherence and
cooperation in a governance system. The more an institution “is autonomous, the more it can both
reference and investigate social facts, political demands, social science research, and human needs.”
Lobel, supra note 2, at 361-62.
228. Cohen & Sabel, supra note 7, at 313-14.
229. In this regard, the partisans of directly deliberative governance draw away from the civic
republicans of the 1990s, see, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL
CONFLICT 56-57 (1996), whom they regard as too conservative in their willingness to work within
the traditional administrative state. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 4, at 282.
230. Cohen and Sabel reject the view that democracy is now practically squeezed between the
market and the state. Therefore, they reject the notion that new governance innovators should focus
on modern ways of preserving “the pre-contractual, pre-political background responsible for
accumulating the social capital we need to preserve our economic and political artifice.” Cohen &
Sabel, supra note 7, at 315. In this, their views are not entirely representative. See, for example,
the work of Elliot Freidson on the importance of professionalism as “a third logic” of regulation that
can mediate the market and the state. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC
(2001). Arguments rooted in professionalism have, at least, the virtue of being able to identify
existing institutions and norms that may be turned towards innovative governance practices.
231. HABERMAS, STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 20; HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS
AND NORMS, supra note 20; HABERMAS, VOLUME II, supra note 20; HABERMAS, VOLUME I, supra
note 20.
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issues.232 Habermas pins his project of the development of “discourse
ethics” upon the belief that these situations are most likely to yield
processes that lead participants in deliberation towards “rational
outcomes” that are most directly in service of the broader “collective
good” rather than merely “political compromises” that entail a “meeting
place” somewhere between the extremes of two partisan preferred
outcomes. Another stream of deliberative theory, which draws most
extensively on the work of Chantal Mouffe,233 has produced empirical
evidence to support the “cathartic effects” of including emotional and
symbolic arguments in processes of deliberation. In our view, it is likely
that no one approach for deliberation will ever yield stable empirical
findings that hold across all contexts: the value of this scholarly work
seems to lie in the provision of suggestive “stories” for how deliberation
tends to work in particular socio-political environments to form the basis
of leading institutionalizations of programs that would require sufficient
flexibility to adjust to be emerging realities of deliberation in each
context—what Holland would call “complex adaptive systems” for
deliberative regulation.234
There is good news for those that would turn over a significant
portion of standard-setting and enforcement to local stakeholders.
Namely, there exists considerable laboratory and field evidence to show
that individuals who differ significantly in values, knowledge, and
perceived self-interest can collaborate to effectively govern their
collective affairs. Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues have presented
much evidence in support of the contention that, while “no one is able to
do a complete [rational] analysis before actions are taken . . . individuals
learn from mistakes and are able to craft tools—including rules—to
improve the structure of the repetitive situations they face.”235 They

232. Dryzek, supra note 89; DRYZEK, supra note 89.
233. MOUFFE, supra note 91; Mouffe, supra note 91.
234. JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY (1995); see
also Ostrom, supra note 10, at 497.
235. Ostrom, supra note 10, at 496; see also PEOPLE AND FORESTS: COMMUNITIES,
INSTITUTIONS, AND GOVERNANCE (Clark C. Gibson, Margaret A. McKean & Elinor Ostrom eds.,
2000); WAI FUNG LAM, GOVERNING IRRIGATION SYSTEMS IN NEPAL: INSTITUTIONS,
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (1998); OSTROM, supra note 216; Elinor Ostrom,
Incentives, Rules of the Game, and Development, in 1995 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD
BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 207-34 (World Bank 1996); Edella
Schlager, Model Specification and Policy Analysis: The Governance of Coastal Fisheries (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington); Edella Schlager et al., Mobile
Flows, Storage, and Self-Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources 70 LAND
ECON. 294 (1994); SHUI YAN TANG, INSTITUTIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: SELF-GOVERNANCE
IN IRRIGATION (1992).
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have shown that people with limited knowledge and real conflicts of
interest, provided with the appropriate governance institutions, tools, and
constraints, can solve complex social problems over time.236
The evidence is not unmixed, however. Some commentators have
suggested that deliberation can increase group agreement, but at the cost
of amplifying between-group disagreement.237 The problem of how
local decisions can be harmonized or coordinated in the larger polity has
been discussed and theorized over, but there has been little actual
experience in practice.
The line between reinventing government and reinventing
governance is drawn clearly between advisory and binding community
deliberation, and the acid test is control over local spending. Budgets for
public goods are very tangible sets of resources that the state controls,
and money is a prime mover, so using budgets to mobilize governance
resources and realign institutions, or create institutional competition and
even institutional death, is very important as a lever over systems of
governance. Participatory budgeting with binding control gives citizens
real decision-making authority over priorities, but does not necessarily
change the locus of control of implementation.
A step further is what might be called “outsourcing to the poor,”
where the government devolves part of the budget to community

236. See Ostrom, supra note 10; Schlager, supra note 235; Schlager et al., supra note 235. For
many years, Elinor Ostrom and colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis
at Indiana University, United States, have collected an immense archive of original case studies
concerning the governance of a range of common pool resources: irrigation systems, forests, inshore
fisheries, and groundwater basins are notable examples. They have been concerned to uncover the
types of dilemmas faced by actors in the field, as well as the types of rules that users have evolved
over time to try to govern and manage the resources effectively in light of these challenges.
Ostrom, supra note 10.
Ostrom and colleagues have identified four main clusters of rules that can be manipulated to affect
appropriation situations in many common pool resources: boundary, authority, pay off, and position
rules. Boundary rules mark and control space to increase the proportion of participants that, with
regard to the community, are well known, have a long-term stake, and find it costly to have their
reputation for trustworthiness harmed in that community. Authority rules are rights and duties (with
respect to practices) awarded to individuals that are enforced through payoff rules. Ostrom, supra
note 10, at 514-16. For example, a fisher may be assigned to a fishing spot subject to financial, or
even criminal, sanction for breach of responsibilities. Position rules pertain to agreed procedures
for monitoring and enforcing compliance with locally negotiated standards. Ostrom, supra note 10,
at 516. For example, most inshore fisheries now use shortwave radios as a routine part of their dayto-day operations, allowing a form of instant monitoring to occur. Given that most fishers listen to
their shortwave radios, negative publicity about one’s breach of rules will be swift and widely
spread, and thereby likely to be followed by a direct approach to the rule violator to correct the
breach. See also FUNG, supra note 106.
237. See Schkade, supra note 186.; Sunstein, supra note 186.
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stakeholders, rather than corporate providers.238 In Thailand, for
example, modest results from a government-led effort at top-down
housing improvement in the 1990s led to a more innovative approach in
which community-based organizations were given responsibility and
spending authority to plan and implement housing upgrades in their own
neighborhoods under the auspices of a government-created and funded,
but independent, public agency, the Community Organizations
Development Institute (“CODI”). CODI has a partnership structure,
with a board of government and civil society representatives, but
primarily works through organizations and networks in the target
communities.239 The theory is that “[w]hen low income households and
their community organizations do the upgrading, and their work is
accepted by other city actors, this enhances their status within the city as
key partners in solving city-wide problems.”240 As of the end of 2004,
upgrading programs were proceeding based on this model in 175
communities involving more than 14,000 households.241
Interest in direct decision-making and real control over
implementation come together in “microgovernance”—a brand of
reinventing governance that emphasizes the need to create new civil
society institutions to ensure that people have “substantial and equal
opportunities to participate directly in decisions that affect them.”242
Microgovernance entails seeding communities that have been excluded
from governance with small institutions around which people can
mobilize their knowledge and capacity.243 In South African townships,
through a new institution called the Peace Committee, residents provide
dispute resolution and community development services that traditional
state bodies were failing to deliver.244 In India, health promotion for sex
238. WOOD & SHEARING, supra note 116, at ch. 4.
239. David Satterthwaite et al., Tools and Methods for Participatory Governance in Cities 26,
presented at the 6th Global Forum on Reinventing Governance (May 24-27, 2005), available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN019656.pdf.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 27; see also Saad S. Yahya, Community Land Trusts and Other Tenure Innovations
in Kenya, in LAND RIGHTS AND INNOVATION: IMPROVING TENURE SECURITY FOR THE URBAN
POOR 233-63 (Geoffrey Payne ed., 2002).
242. FUNG, supra note 106, at 4; Burris, Drahos & Shearing, supra note 11; DEVAS, supra note
106.
243. Burris, supra note 108.
244. Michael Kempa and Clifford Shearing provide a detailed description of the initial dispute
resolution program. Kempa et al., supra note 92, at 34-36. The Zwelethemba Model for
Peacemaking and Peace-Building bears the name of the community in which the initial pilot work
took place: Zwelethemba, a community within the Worcester municipality, a country town near
Cape Town, South Africa. The name “Zwelethemba,” a Xhosa word, fortuitously means “place of
hope.”
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The Zwelethemba model provides a micro-institutional, technological, and resource basis for
providing governmental services at the local level through the mobilization of local knowledge and
capacity. The model approaches governance through the window of dispute resolution. It uses this
window to foster the development of institutions of community self-regulation. It also uses this
window to support a culture of collective efficacy in places where state government has had
difficulty in delivering services over the course of South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to
inclusive democracy. Although designed to enhance community security in an immediate sense, the
model also develops an institutional framework that can facilitate effective community direction in
other domains of governance, such as health promotion, education, and housing.
The Zwelethemba model is built around the right and ability of communities to solve their own
problems. It has two components: dispute resolution (i.e., peacemaking) and community
development through financial grants that are derived from state and non-state sources (i.e., peacebuilding and local development generally) that are organized and conducted through Peace
Committees made up of five to twenty people. When a dispute arises, members of the Committee
sponsor a gathering of people thought to be in a position to contribute to dispute resolution. The
gathering’s focus is finding solutions that let people move forward amicably. Participation is
voluntary and no coercion, punishment, or violence is allowed. A Code of Good Practice, which
recognizes the governing authority of the South African Constitution, along with Steps that ensure
consistency and compliance with the Code, regulate the process. Audit procedures, coordinated by
a nongovernmental organization called the Community Peace Program (affiliated with the school of
Government, University of the Western Cape and funded by international development grants, and
partially by the South African state) are used to ensure that embedded regulations operate
effectively. While any dispute can give rise to a gathering, the focus is on the small things that, if
left unresolved, lead to larger problems.
The model is designed to be inexpensive, but not free. Each time a Peace Gathering is held, a
payment is made to the Committee by local governments or other funders. Thirty percent of this
goes to the members conducting the gathering to compensate them for their time. Sixty percent is
paid into a peace building fund used by the Committee for community development projects. A
final ten percent goes to an administrative fund for the costs of operating the Committee. Since
these funds are earned locally, a great deal of care is taken to ensure that they are spent on the
bottom line of community development. Thus, the program provides for greater security, responds
to generic issues, enhances self-direction, and promotes human rights.
Since its inauguration in 1998, the Zwelethemba model has been continuously refined through
ongoing experimentation, and has proven to be robust, sustainable, and easily reproduced. The
model has been rolled out all over South Africa. To date over 80,000 people have participated in
over 12,000 gatherings in South Africa.
In November 2000, the project was initiated in Rosario, Argentina through a partnership with the
Universities of Rosario and Toronto, and national and local governments of Argentina and Canada.
Already, work in Argentina indicates that the model is transferable to at least one other very
different socio-political context.
In the pilot area of Zwelethemba, members of the Community Peace Programme have randomly
surveyed the area on several follow-up occasions to determine the perceived efficacy of, and
community satisfaction with, the dispute resolution process (on each of these occasions, the number
surveyed was between 70 to 100 persons). The Community Peace Programme has also undertaken
an assessment of the contribution being made by the process as a whole toward fostering collective
capital and cohesion within the community.
In 1997, at the inception of the project, 19.7% of persons surveyed responded that “the way in
which disputes are handled” in their communities had “improved” in the last six months, while
80.3% indicated that things had “stayed the same or become worse.” By 1999, the proportion
reporting an improvement increased to 49%, while the proportion reporting no difference or
deterioration was reduced to 35%, with 15% responding that they were “not sure.”
In 1998, respondents were asked whether they thought that the public police were being called for
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workers has been built around collectives like the Durbar Mahila
Samanwaya Committee (DMSC) in Sonagachi.245 The DMSC collective
has grown into a stable NGO that promotes sex-worker well-being
broadly, through programs of microlending and education, but also in
significant part by mobilizing sex worker’s power to resist intimidation
by police and other traditional community governors. New governance
practices like these not only change how specific activities are managed,
but also potentially the dynamics of the larger urban governance system.
Proponents contend that microgovernance projects like sex worker
collectives and peace committees enable communities to manage the
course of events in at least three ways. First, they create an institution
around which resources and situated knowledge can cohere, and in
which people can define their own needs and priorities for change.246
Second, they reconfigure relations of governance within the community,
filling governance gaps or competing with under-performing
institutions.247 In the Peace Committee example, both the police and
African National Congress street committees were present to control
similar dispute problems more or less often than in the past six months. The results are indicative of
a trend towards the perception that the public police are being called less often rather than more
often—46% versus 37.9% respectively.
Similarly, 1999 saw the belief that people in the community were capable of handling most local
disputes increase to 59% relative to 48.2% in 1998. Finally, community awareness and use of local
Peace Committees had clearly increased from 1998 to 1999, with 3.4% versus 32% mentioning
these bodies when asked who had helped them solve a dispute problem in the past six months on the
two respective occasions.
Taken together, these data indicate that perceptions of both the level of safety in the community,
and the capacity of the community to actively bring about these positive outcomes, are on the rise.
The increasing use of Peace Committees over this same time period indicates that the project is
making a meaningful contribution towards facilitating both of these sets of outcomes. With regard
to the objective of fostering community development, a range of projects have been supported
through community-block grants earned through gatherings held. Such projects include: the
building and maintenance of a children’s playground in a shack area far from any other facility; the
refurbishment of an old home; assistance in furnishing a new day care center; and a feeding scheme
for children, designed to promote health.
The emphasis in these projects has been on using the services that local people are able to provide,
thereby creating and increasing the number of baseline local market opportunities that are available
to local micro-entrepreneurs. Resources earned this way can be used subsequently by microentrepreneurs to develop further market opportunities into which an expanding number of
community members can be drawn. Kempa et al., supra note 92, at 34-36.
245. Smarajit Jana et al., The Sonagachi Project: A Sustainable Community Intervention
Program, 16 AIDS EDUC. & PREV. 405 (2004); Flora Cornish & Riddhi Ghosh, The Necessary
Contradictions of ‘Community-Led’ Health Promotion: A Case Study of HIV Prevention in an
Indian Red Light District, 64 SOC. SCI. & MED. 496 (2007).
246. See Cornish & Gosh, supra note 245, at 504 (noting the success of the sex worker project
due to involvement and negotiations among those affected by the industry).
247. See id. (noting that the addition of other people to the project was necessary for its
success).
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crime in the townships; but their methods were not useful for dealing
with smaller disputes or reducing violence. Peace Committees first
filled a service gap, then began to work with the police to “share”
jurisdiction over community security.
Third, microgovernance
institutions reconfigure relations between the community and the larger
system it inhabits.248 Microgovernance can be amplified by networking
strategies through which community-based organizations increase their
influence locally, and in upstream politics, by linking together.249
Federations like Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI) “work
together to support each other—from community to community within
cities, from city to city within nations, and internationally.”250 The
DMSC, and other sex worker collectives in India, have enabled sex
workers to enter into the national debate about HIV/AIDS and sex work
policy.
Finally, governance innovators have their own version of the
market regulation characteristic of reinventing government. Information
about the harmful consequences of consumer, distributor or producer
behavior can be used both to punish bad actors and provide positive
incentives for better practices. Responsible planetary stewardship and
engagement in governance can be promoted in corporate and consumer
circles through the distribution of information about the negative
consequences of bad manufacture and consumption practices. These
processes are illustrated in the “fair trade” movement, which certifies
growers and traders of products like coffee who observe
environmentally and socially sound production and import practices.251

248. See id. at 505 (noting the effect that the sex worker project had on the relationship of sex
workers with others in the community).
249. Arjun Appadurai, Deep Democracy: Urban Governmentality and the Horizon of Politics,
13 ENVT. & URBANIZATION 23 (2001); Sandra Yu & Anna Marie Karaos, Establishing the Role of
Communities in Governance: The Experience of the Homeless People’s Federation Philippines, 16
ENVT. AND URBANIZATION 107 (2004); Celine D’Cruz & David Satterthwaite, The Role of Urban
Grassroots Organizations and Their National Federations in Reducing Poverty and Achieving the
Millennium Development Goals, 2 GLOBAL URB. DEV. 1 (2006).
250. D’Cruz & Satterthwaite, supra note 249, at 2; Appadurai, supra note 249; Sheela Patel,
Sundar Burra & Celine D’Cruz, Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI)—Foundations to
Treetops, 13 ENVT. AND URBANIZATION 45 (2001); Sheela Patel & Diana Mitlin, The work of
SPARC, the National Slum Dwellers Federation and Mahila Milan, Working Paper Series on
Poverty Reduction in Urban Areas, Working Paper 5, Dec. 2001, available at
http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdf/full/9074IIED.pdf.
251. Peter Leigh Taylor has described the success of Fair Trade Coffee initiatives in great
detail. Taylor, supra note 43. Coffee is one of the five most important commodities in the world
market, and is principally produced by poor, small-scale farmers in the global South. Since the
collapse of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989, prices have fallen to their lowest levels in a
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C. Innovation in Governance: Combating Institutional Fetishism or
Succumbing to Intellectual Fashion?
The difference between reinventing governance and reinventing
government is conceptually fuzzy, but practically stark: it marks the
point at which true control over decisions and resources moves from
government to non-state actors. As important as that difference is,
however, there is a great deal of overlap between the two genres we have
defined. The programs use similar tools, such as institutional redesign,
deliberative negotiation, participatory budgets, and information. They
both reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, the rejection of the belief that
social goods can only be delivered through the institutions and processes
that traditionally have delivered them—what Roberto Unger calls
“institutional fetishism.”252 And both approaches are open to critical
interrogation on the same key points.
Somewhere near the heart of both approaches is the belief that
tradition approaches to state regulation have lost much of their bite.
Explanations range from a sort of Hayakian “I told you so,” to nuanced
accounts of system complexity offered by Gunther Teubner, to the
hundred years. Millions of small farmer families have suffered the loss of their livelihoods as a
result.
Fair Trade Coffee is an inter-organizational network clustered around circulating information about
coffee production, and linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world
economy. A point stressed by this network is that surplus profits accrue to roasters and distributing
houses in coffee production chains, which are mostly located in the global North. The network aims
explicitly to alter these trade relations through certifying coffee brands that make use of equitable
coffee production chains. First, their producer operations must be small-scale and family based, be
organized politically into democratic associations, and pursue ecological goals. Second, coffee
buyers must purchase directly from local organizations with contracts extending beyond one harvest
cycle, guaranteeing both an acceptable minimal price and a social premium per pound.
Fair Trade is unique among certification schemes worldwide because the buyer, rather than the
producer, pays the cost of certification and monitoring by the Fair Trade organization. As these
costs are passed up the commodity chain, Fair Trade is mostly financed by the consumer’s
willingness to pay more for fair coffee. This willingness to pay is supported by the building of
direct personal ties between Northern consumers and Southern producers.
With special-needs commodities such as fair trade coffee, moral and ideological considerations are
added to the value of the product itself. Consumers are conscious of the participation in
humanitarian or charitable actions when they buy a certain product over another, and are thereby
constituted as responsible global consumers.
Although its roots lie in the alternative trade movement, Fair Trade began offering products in large,
non-alternative channels in the early 1980s. In 1997, the labeling scheme was introduced under the
Fair Trade Labeling Organization. Today, Fair Trade pursues a “mainstreaming strategy” that aims
to achieve rapid growth in market share by encouraging corporations, governments, major retailers,
and other large economic actors to support fair trade. Mainstreaming has accomplished much on
these measures. The strategy’s most visible recent success has been the enlistment of Starbucks,
now the largest U.S. buyer of fair trade coffee.
252. UNGER, supra note 5, at 6-8.
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optimistic “we can fix this” prescriptions of regulatory technologists like
Braithwaite, Rhodes, and Ian Ayres, to the happy pluralism of Shearing
and Ostrom that embraces non-state governance.253 Precisely because it
is so widely accepted, it may be the idea most deserving of cautious
treatment.254 Certainly an idea reaches its point of greatest danger to
clear thinking when it is universally acknowledged.
Many regulatory scholars have argued that it is just plain wrong, as
an empirical matter, to claim that command and control regulation is
doomed to failure, let alone that the state is withering away.255 Even
sympathetic readers of the new governance literature have argued that it
“would be foolish to ‘throw out the state’ with the governance or
governmentality bath water . . . [W]e should not get carried away with ‘a
giddy sense at the moment among many intellectuals that the state is
passé.’”256 Putting aside the utility of the state as a command and
control regulator, Adam Crawford reminds us that it is useful to
governance innovators in a number of ways, including “in its symbolic
power and cultural authority; in its legitimacy claims and public
perceptions of its legitimacy; as a distinctive (tactical) resource and
source of information through which interests are pursued; [and] in its
residual position as a back-up of last resort with regard to other forms of
control.”257
New governance scholarship is also at risk of overestimating the
advantages of localism. Local participation in governance is certainly
the foundation of many of the positive developments in governance. It
is an enduring strategy in civic reform. But localism has its pitfalls, as
well as benefits:
Foremost among these are domination or capture by powerful factions
or persons in small groups, the paralysis of local groups due to
conflictual deadlock, and their lack of capacity and sophistication.
Circumstances of pervasive inequality and conflict . . . further
253. See Lobel, supra note 2, at 364-70 (describing a belief in regulatory failure as an
important piece of new governance thinking).
254. To be sure, many of the new governance scholars reject the notion that government
regulation is always a failure. See, e.g., Cohen & Sabel, supra note 7. But that does not stop them
from pushing the state into new roles on the basis of its maladaption to the needs of contemporary
governance.
255. Moran, supra note 2, at 396 (“evidence in the wider literature is nothing like as damning
as the critics of ‘command’ suggest and that the history of command in clean air regulation shows
no clear tendency for the effectiveness of command to decline over time.”).
256. Crawford, supra note 29, at 458 (citations omitted). See generally STEVEN CROLEY,
REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS, THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT
(2008) (arguing that effective regulatory government is eminently possible).
257. Id. at 459.
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compound these difficulties. These problems may well overwhelm the
benefits to autonomy understood as neighborhood decentralization.258

Devolution may simply give more power to those in the community that
already have it.259 The voices of the poorer, weaker, more socially
marginal can be ignored. Women may be denied the chance to speak at
all. Those with greater resources of experience, money, or skill can
game the local system as they can a national government.260 Urban
settings often have large populations of “illegal” internal or international
migrants whose right to a place at the table is contested.261 It is also easy
to forget that local politics is not isolated from national politics.
Urbanites do not necessarily, or even most of the time, organize
themselves and vote as urban dwellers, but rather act as members of
ideological or ethnic blocks organized around issues of national salience,
issues that may reflect and worsen divisions at the local level.262
None of these caveats suggest that new governance scholars take a
naïve view of the task. None of them would dispute that the promotion
of innovation in governance will certainly benefit from a significant
investment in research and practice. On the research side, more support
is required for study of the “design principles” or grammars, of
successful governance, particularly outside of, and in partnership with,
government.263 Research is needed, but it is probably even more
important to fund governance “entrepreneurs” reinventing governance in
communities around the world, and to support ongoing community
processes of governance reinvention. Funders and governments speak
about the importance of good governance and strong civil society, but
investment in general governance capacity, unlinked to a particular
categorical program or specific objective, is still too rare. From a
governance point of view, the mechanisms now used to assure
transparency and accountability too often also promote aid silos and the
diversion of valuable local resources to filling out reports to funders. The
resources that local problem-solvers need to fuel their innovation
thereby become barriers to autonomous action.
258. Fung, supra note 109, at 75. See generally JAMES MANOR, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION (1999).
259. Craig Johnson, Priya Deshingkar & Daniel Start, Grounding the State: Devolution and
Development in India’s Panchayats, 41 J. OF DEV. STUD. 937 (2005).
260. ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY
(1961).
261. Shearing & Wood, supra note 92.
262. DEVAS, supra note 106.
263. ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (2005); Mashaw, supra
note 16.
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Investment is also necessary to sustain and build on success. Even
successful models of participatory governance – and there are many –
remain “feel good” stories for researchers, governments, and NGOs
unless they can be replicated at a sufficient scale to influence the
condition of the mass of urbanites. “When such projects function well
and are spread over the entire city, they are always characterized by a
highly motivated municipality, civic commitment, active participation
by the inhabitants of poor neighborhoods, effective communication, and
stable funding over several years,”264 but there are many stories of
successful local health governance models that ultimately failed for lack
of ongoing funding.265 Particularly when dealing with civil society in
developing countries, Northern actors must recognize that civil society
organizations in developed countries are only sustainable because they
receive annual infusions of cash from government contracts and private
donors writing checks from within a philanthropic tradition reflecting
general wealth, social norms and, often, tax incentives.
V. CONCLUSION
Governance is the management of the course of events in a social
system. Even in periods of apparent stability, governance has always
been an adaptive social process. Today, perhaps, developments in the
collection and use of information have made changes more rapid and
obvious. “Reinventing government” has been part of a primarily neoliberal project of reform for almost two decades now, but has gradually
broadened into a widespread effort to describe and prescribe changes in
governance generally. Regardless of the label, observers have
documented governance changes in the form of shifts in the institutions
exercising governance control, changes in methods of power, and
changes in the nature and effectiveness of constraints on governors.
Contemporary governance is now widely understood to be polycentric,
distributed along complex networks. These developments may be good
for democracy in general and the world’s majority of have-nots in
particular, but so far much of that good remains to be realized. The
efficacy of traditional hierarchical systems for governance is thought to
have diminished, but few alternative systems for steering policy
networks in the public interest have developed, with the net effect that

264. Isabelle Milbert, Slums, Slum Dwellers and Multilevel Governance, 18 EUR. J. OF DEV.
RES. 299, 313 (2006).
265. Barten et al., supra note 10.
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governance has been skewed across all collective good domains in the
interests of the most powerful classes.
The description one chooses of contemporary governance tends to
shape the kinds of innovations one proposes. Those who see the state as
still the most potent of governors, or who want to restore its strength,
focus their innovation on “reinventing government.” Typically, within
the dominant neo-liberal prescription, state authorities attempt to retain a
hand on the tiller to steer service design and provision, ostensibly in the
public interest. Existing institutions are seen as largely the right ones,
provided they can adopt some new mechanisms of oversight and
cooperation. Existing constraints on state-centered governance (like
voting, transparency, etc.) are seen as sufficient to prevent abuse of
power or corruption.
Those who question either the capacity or the will of states to
govern effectively for the public good, and who see non-state actors as
prime engines of governance, tend to promote more innovation in
institutions, tools of governance, and norms. They particularly favor
institutions that mobilize previously untapped knowledge and capacity,
and that give true control to these new institutions. Similarly, they look
to governance tools suitable for non-state actors without either great
wealth or the capacity to use force: information disseminated across
networks is perhaps the primary such tool.
Thus, the problem of innovation in governance revolves around the
distribution of governing power across social space. Participatory
democracy, localism, and deliberation are acknowledged by all parties to
the debate as promising, important and imperfect. Devolution may
simply give more power to those in the community who are already
powerful, further marginalizing those who are excluded from shaping
governance practices and outcomes. Conversely, local groups might
come up with programs for governance that offend basic principles of
democracy—whether these groups are comprised of the mainstream or
marginalized. These questions lead on to concerns of ultimate
accountability and responsibility for governance: where governance is
diffuse, who is ultimately responsible when policy develops in
undesirable directions or service delivery goes off track?
The capacity of the global community to manage the challenges
humanity has crafted for itself is perhaps the central question of our
time. Governance has been a lens through which theorists and
practitioners have tried to approach the question of rational, just and
sustainable management of our world. The literature on governance
offers many promising technologies, but there is still the human element,

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

65

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 7
BURRIS_FINAL

66

1/25/2008 10:29:41 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:1

for “what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature?”266 The changes in governance we have described have
in many instances been deliberate and planned, but it would be error to
see the ferment as either a rational or organized phenomenon. The
challenge, after all, is not to adapt to a changing social and physical
environment, but to adapt rationally and fairly. Systems of governance
can help promote rationality and fairness, but these are, in the end,
characteristics of people, not systems.

266. JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 51.
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